

February 16, 2005

Daniel Ellsberg

GRANT PROPOSAL

For a book on U.S. nuclear war planning, policies, and threats
and on how, urgently, to reduce the dangers these pose
of proliferation, imitative policies by new nuclear states, nuclear wars,
and possible human extinction

The Armageddon Secret

Overview

As nuclear dangers become more and more a part of the news—from terrorist dirty bombs to suitcase bombs, from regional nuclear war in India and Pakistan to more U.S. first-use nuclear threats like the ones posed tacitly to Saddam Hussein against his possible use of WMD's—Americans would do well to learn about the background of these dangers, how American policy has contributed to them steadily for sixty years, and what changes in American policy and leadership are essential to reducing them. Yet, virtually no insider memoirs of the nuclear era by an actual staff planner have ever been written—and not any that go into detail about the top secret policymaking that led to these contemporary nuclear dangers.

Before he worked on Vietnam for the Defense and State departments, and before he released the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg worked at the highest levels of the U.S. secrecy system on a completely different issue: preventing nuclear Armageddon between the superpowers. In 1961 and 1962, he drafted for the Secretary of Defense the top secret planning guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the operational general nuclear war plans. In 1962 he was a participant in two of the three working groups reporting to the ExCom of the NSC during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Later he was sole researcher, with clearances higher than top secret, on an interdepartmental study of nuclear crises including the Cuban Crisis. As consultant and then special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, he became aware of high-level policy considerations that regularly took priority over and secretly blocked effective arms limitations and anti-proliferation policies: and which have done so ever since, most ominously under the present administration.

His political memoir of the nuclear era, *The Armageddon Secret*, will be the first book, told from an insider's perspective, to describe: the little-understood, potentially disastrous dangers of U.S. nuclear planning, continuous pursuit of strategic superiority, and secret first-use and first-strike threats; the resulting hoax of American "arms control" and "non-proliferation" policy; the secrecy system that conceals these policies from democratic control by Congress or public; and the challenge to morality of our threatening and preparing to commit the greatest crimes against humanity ever contemplated, while secretly rejecting most measures well-understood to be essential to reducing these dangers.

His continuous study of these problems since he left government consulting reveals far more continuity than fundamental change, both in the policies and in the overall risks they pose, though the specific forms of the dangers have evolved. An insider's knowledge of the earlier secret history of US nuclear and supposedly "anti-proliferation" policies gives both Ellsberg and

his readers a different and highly enlightening perspective on our current predicaments and what it will take to escape them. For example, the allegedly radical proposals of the Bush administration, in favor of preemption, first-use threats, and continued testing and development of nuclear weapons (all at the cost of effective arms control and limiting proliferation), far from being unprecedented departures, are seen to have deep bureaucratic and political roots, which have never been adequately exposed to public view, debate or challenge.

This memoir will also present a detailed, concrete program of policy changes and international agreements and measures that could, if adopted, quickly and radically reduce these dangers, on the way to abolition of the use and possession of nuclear weapons. The information and interpretations to be presented for the first time will surely be valuable, perhaps indispensable, to the mobilization of an American and domestic campaign of public concern, legislative and media investigation, insider whistleblowing, activism and electoral pressure that can turn America and the society of nations back from its present course toward a nuclear abyss.

BUDGET

Personnel

Daniel Ellsberg	\$65,000
Research, Administrative and Editorial Support	20,000

Travel for Research

Lodging	1,000
Airfare	1,500

Office Expenses

Transcription	2,000
Supplies and copies	3,000

Postage	500
Internet Access	360

Total	\$93,360
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■ Picketers Storm Newspaper Offices in Southern Mexico

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES: • Understanding the importance of the business plan • Understanding the importance of the business plan • Understanding the importance of the business plan

***** ORDER TO CARRY FREE FRANKS *****

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Monday, June 18, 2007
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One day in my thirtieth year I was shown how the world would end. Not the earth, not—so far as I knew then, or for the next twenty years--all humanity or life, but the destruction of most cities and people in the Northern Hemisphere.

What I was handed, in a White House office, was a single sheet of paper with some numbers and lines on it. It was headed Top Secret—Sensitive; under that, For the President's Eyes Only. The "Eyes Only" designation meant that, in principle, it was to be seen and read only by the person to whom it was explicitly addressed, though in practice this usually meant that it would be seen by one or more secretaries and assistants as well: a handful of people, sometimes somewhat more, instead of the scores to hundreds who would normally see copies of a "Top Secret—Sensitive" document.

Later, working in the Pentagon as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, I often found myself reading copies of cables and memos marked Eyes Only though I was not an addressee, nor for that matter was my boss. And by the time I read this one, as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it was routine for me to read Top Secret documents. But I had never before seen one marked For the President's Eyes Only, and I never did again.

The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, Bob Komer, a friend and colleague, showed it to me. A cover sheet identified it as the answer to President Kennedy of a question he had addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a week earlier. Komer showed it to me because I had drafted the question, which Komer had sent in the president's name.

The question to the JCS was: "If your plans for general [nuclear] war are carried out as planned, how many people will be killed in the Soviet Union and China?"

Their answer was in the form of a graph. The vertical axis was the number of deaths, in millions. The horizontal axis was time, indicated in months. The graph was a straight line, starting on the vertical axis at time zero—the number of immediate deaths expected within hours of our attack—and slanting upwards to a maximum at six months, an arbitrary cut-off for the deaths that would accumulate over time from initial injuries and from fall-out radiation.

The lowest number, at the left of the graph, was 275 million deaths. The number at the right-hand side, at six months, was 325 million.

[GRAPH]

That same morning, with Komer's approval, I drafted another question to be sent to the Chiefs over the president's signature, asking for a total break-down of global deaths from our own attacks, to include not only the whole Sino-Soviet bloc but all other countries that would be affected by fall-out. Again their answer was prompt. Komer showed it to me about a week later, this time in the form of a table, with explanatory foot-notes.

In sum, another hundred million deaths, roughly, were predicted in East Europe. There might be a hundred million deaths from fall-out in West Europe, depending on which way the wind blew (a matter, largely, of the season). Another hundred million, at least, from fall-out in countries adjacent to the Soviet Bloc and China, most of them neutral: Finland, Austria, Afghanistan, India, Japan and others. Finland, for example, would be wiped out by fall-out from U.S. ground-burst explosions on the Soviet submarine pens at Leningrad.

The total death-toll as calculated by the Joint Chiefs, from a US first strike aimed primarily at the Soviet Union, would be roughly six hundred million dead. A hundred Holocausts.

I remember what I thought when I held the single sheet with the graph (above) on it. I thought, this piece of paper should not exist. It should never have existed. Not in America. Not anywhere, ever. It was evil beyond any human project that had ever existed. There should be nothing on earth, nothing real, that it referred to.

But there was, all right. I knew what it dealt with was real. I had seen the bombs myself, Mark 12A H-bombs with an explosive yield each of 1.1 megatons—half the total explosive power of all the bombs of World War II-- slung under single-pilot F-100 fighter-bombers on alert at Kadena airbase on Okinawa, ready to take off on ten minutes notice. On one occasion I had laid my hand on one of these, not yet loaded on a plane. On a cool day, the smooth metallic surface of the bomb was warm, from the radiation within: a body warmth.

At Kadena, the pilots weren't in the alert planes or in the hut on the strip; they were allowed to be elsewhere, at the PX or in their quarters, each with his individual jeep and driver, because they practiced the alert at least once a day. The officer in charge told our research group, which was there to study and improve command and control for the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), we could choose the time for that day's rehearsal. When our leader said, later, "OK, now," the klaxons sounded all over the area and jeeps appeared on all the roads leading to the strip, rushing around curves, pilots leaping out as they reached the strip and scrambling into the cockpits, still tightening their helmets and gear. Engines starting in ten planes, almost simultaneously. Ten minutes.

They didn't taxi or take off, as SAC-- Strategic Air Command--planes did in their daily rehearsals (their crews stayed on the strip throughout their watch), because the Mark-12 thermonuclear weapons were not designed to be slung outside a tactical plane like the F-100 without a bomb-bay, they weren't safe enough. If the planes taxied down the runway every day in practice, and one plane collided with another or had some other mishap that led to an impact involving a bomb, the high explosive inside it had a small chance of exploding, spreading radioactivity. There might even have been a partial nuclear detonation, on the scale of the Hiroshima explosion, though the chance of that was still smaller. So the pilots just revved their engines in place, to meet the ten-minute deadline.

These were tactical fighter-bombers, with limited range. There were more than a thousand of them in range of Russia and China, armed with H-bombs, on strips like this or on aircraft carriers surrounding the Sino-Soviet Bloc (as we still thought of it in 1961, though China and the Soviets had actually split apart a couple of years before that). Each of them could devastate a large city with one bomb. For a larger metropolitan area, it might take two. Yet SAC, which did not command these planes (they were under the control of theater commanders), regarded these tactical, theater forces as so unreliable and insignificant as a factor in all-out nuclear war that SAC planners had not until this year included them in their calculations of the outcome of attacks in a general war.

Before then, planners at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Section at SAC headquarters counted for deterrence and war-fighting only on the attacks by the heavy bombers and ICBMs commanded by SAC, along with Polaris sub-launched missiles. In the bomb-bays of the SAC planes were thermonuclear bombs much larger than the Mark-12s I saw in Okinawa. Many were five or ten megatons in yield. A relative few had the explosive power of twenty megatons: each bomb the equivalent of twenty million tons of TNT--ten times the total tonnage we dropped in World War II--more power than all the bombs and shells exploded in all the wars of human history.

These intercontinental bombers and missiles had come to be stationed almost entirely in the continental US, though they might be deployed to forward bases outside it in a crisis. A small force of B-52's was constantly airborne. Many of the rest were on alert. I had seen a classified film of an incredible maneuver in which a column of B-58's--smaller than B-52's but still intercontinental heavy bombers--taxied down a runway and then took off simultaneously, rather than one at a time. The point--as at Kadena and elsewhere--was to get in the air and away from the field as fast as possible, on warning of an imminent attack, before an enemy missile might arrive.

In the film these heavy bombers, each big as an airliner, sped up in tandem as they raced down the airstrip, one behind the other so close that if one had slackened its pace for an instant the plane behind, with its full fuel load and its multiple thermonuclear weapons, would have rammed into its tail. Then they lifted together, like a flock of birds startled by a gunshot. It was an astonishing sight; it was beautiful.

In the time it would normally have taken for a single plane to take off, a squadron of planes would be airborne, on their way to their preassigned targets. These included, along with military sites, nearly every city in the Soviet Union and China.

On carriers, smaller, tactical bombers would be boosted on takeoff by a catapult, a kind of large slingshot. But since the general nuclear war-plan, as I knew, called for takeoff around the world of as many U.S. planes and missiles as were ready at the time of the execute order--as near-simultaneously as possible--to attack targets that were all assigned in prior planning, the preparations contemplated one overall, preplanned and inflexible global attack as if the vehicles with their warheads were launched by a single catapult. As if David had flung all four of his smooth stones (now, closer to four thousand) at one time from his sling.

The rigidity of the single, coordinated plan--which included tactical bombers, by 1961, in what was termed the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP--meant that its underlying "strategy" amounted to nothing more than a vast trucking operation to transport thermonuclear warheads to Soviet and Chinese cities and military sites. The latter were the great majority of targets, since all the cities could be destroyed by a small fraction of the attacking vehicles. One of the principal expected effects of this plan--partly intended, partly "collateral" but unavoidable--was summarized on the piece of paper I held that day in the spring of 1961: the extermination of over half a billion people.

I have said that I saw that day how the northern civilized world would end. I might have said, "could" end, but that wasn't the conclusion I drew then, and often since. I did still believe at that time, along with the American public, that the predominant intent of this planning and deployment and rehearsals was to *deter* Soviet attacks, not only nuclear but (the public wasn't clear on this) large conventional, non-nuclear aggression in Europe. Thus, the story went, it was all designed to prevent such Soviet attacks from ever taking place. This global machine had been constructed so that it would never be set in motion: in hopes, as it was often said, that it would never be used. (The official motto of SAC, on display at all its bases, was "Peace Is Our Profession.")

To be sure, I already knew, perhaps better than any other civilian, how the machine might go off "by accident": by false alarm, miscalculation, miscommunication, unauthorized action. Studying that, in the field, was my special mission in the study for CINCPAC, and later as a specialist in "command and control" of nuclear weapons. Moreover, I had learned in the Pacific one of the most sensitive secrets in the system: that to forestall the possibility that our retaliatory response might be paralyzed either by a Soviet attack on Washington or by presidential incapacity, President Eisenhower had secretly delegated to theater commanders the authority to launch nuclear operations in a crisis, either in the latter event (Eisenhower had suffered both a stroke and a heart attack in office) or if communications were cut off with Washington.

I had also learned that CINCPAC, at least, had likewise delegated that authority downward in his command, under like conditions. That put many fingers on the button if

communications went out between Washington and Hawaii, or Hawaii and the Western Pacific: as happened on average, for each of these, part of every day. It magnified greatly the possibilities listed above for "inadvertent, accidental" nuclear war.

I had informed the incoming Special Assistant to the President for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, of both of these closely-held facts, among other things, in January, 1961. (The response of the Kennedy Administration is discussed later). That briefing, arranged by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), was in part the reason I was in a position to draft questions for the White House soon after.

Moreover, it was a commonplace in the circles where I worked that deterrence was not foolproof, it might fail; it was not impossible that the Soviets would attack despite our best efforts to dissuade them. What to do then was a subject for highly classified discussion. On this point the official plans were unequivocal, simple in intent: the demolition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. But it was possible to discuss, very discreetly, heretical alternatives (some but not others: *not*, in particular, a decision not to carry out nuclear retaliatory threats at all).

In particular, colleagues at Rand and some in the Air Force staff proposed a focus, if deterrence failed, not on revenge but on limiting subsequent damage to the U.S., for example by attacking offensive military targets rather than cities. There would still be massive "collateral damage" to civilians from attacks near cities and from fall-out, though radically less than in the existing plans. But even for the current approach, with cities targeted, it had seemed to me—and, I supposed, to everyone involved--self-evident that there were limits to the potential destruction of enemy lives and society that were either required for deterrence or could be justified for damage-limitation to ourselves. Limits, it seemed to go without saying, that would scarcely be visible on the scale of the JCS' chart.

But the numbers on the graph and table told me something different. And they told me at the same time that anyone's hopes that the alert forces on either side might never be used were ill-founded.

As it happens, I had drafted the question in the belief that the JCS did not know an answer to it. Officers I worked with in the planning staff of the Air Force were convinced that no one, either in the Joint Staff or the Air Staff, had ever calculated the overall human consequences of carrying out their plans. That encouraged me to persuade a higher authority to ask them for an estimate, in the expectation they would be embarrassed by having to admit their ignorance. (The point of this was to gain advantage in a bureaucratic effort, discussed below, to change the plans.) But the expectation was wrong. The Chiefs were embarrassed neither by the question, nor by their answer. That was the surprise: that, and the answer itself. The implications, as I saw them, were literally existential.

The humans who had built this machine, *knowing*, it turned out, that it would do what they now estimated if it were turned on--and who were unabashed to report that to the president, assuming (correctly) he would not order them to be dishonorably discharged and the machine to be dismantled--humans like that, presidents included, would not fail someday to decide to pull the switch. And humans like these were surely at work in every nuclear weapons state, and would be in the future. So I thought then, and have ever since.

I did, after all, know many of these people, though not apparently as well as I had thought. What was frightening was precisely that I knew they were not evil, in any ordinary, or extraordinary, sense. They were ordinary Americans. I was sure they were not different, surely not worse, than the people in Russia who were doing the same work, or the people who would sit at the same desks in later U.S. administrations. I liked most of the ones I knew. Not only the physicists at Rand who designed bombs and the economists who speculated on strategy (like me), but the colonels who worked on these very plans, who I consulted with during the workday and drank beer with in the evenings.

That chart set me the problem, which I have worked at nearly half a century, of understanding my fellow humans—us, I'm not separate—in the light of this potential for self-destruction of our species and of most others. This likelihood. A certainty? Some days I think so, as I did that morning in the White House. Other times not, or I would not have lived as I have and still do, and I would not be writing this book.

Page 129 November 1985

Notes on the legitimacy of nuclear threats and warfare.

—The public's lack of mobilization on the nuclear issue adequate to overthrowing a Presidential and Establishment policy reflects, in part, the belief that nuclear war will not happen, cannot happen: because deliberately starting a nuclear war is, after all, unthinkable. And that, in turn, because doing it, or even thinking about actually doing it, is illegitimate.

Unthinkable, why? Because it would be suicidal. (Though suicide is not exactly uncommon; thinking about it, still less! But this would be mass, universal suicide. Well?) Or at any rate, monumentally imprudent, reckless, an unacceptable risk of total catastrophe.

Prudence and legitimacy are bound together here. One is permitted to take high risks for oneself—it is legitimate to do it (e.g., in certain sports, or in war, in gambling, in business—even though it would not be prudent or even seem reasonable to do so. But when these risks involve other potential victims (e.g., when investing someone else's money; or a physical catastrophe may engulf others) what is not prudent may be forbidden, illegitimate, wrong. It is "not to be thought of." And if the scale of the risk is high enough, it may not be permitted even for oneself. Thus, suicide is widely ruled to be illegal and wrong (barring one from burial in a Catholic graveyard, for example).

But would use of nuclear weapons always be suicidal, or involve a high risk of suicide or universal catastrophe? Using them against an opponent that did not possess nuclear weapons, and did not have a clear commitment of nuclear support from an ally, would not clearly involve such a risk. But that too is "unthinkable," simply illegitimate for reasons other than prudence. It would be—it is thought—unjustifiable, unforgivable bullying, impossible for the US to consider or do. (See Michael Walzer on Just War). It would be disproportionate, even used against military targets; such a country could not pose such a threat to the US or its forces as to justify such destruction. Used against civilians, it would be indiscriminate slaughter, a war crime (no more so than conventional strategic bombing, but on a larger scale, and with a greater risk of further escalation).

But is that not exactly what the US did to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945? Answer: That is to be explained, if not justified, by the preceding four years of world war, starting for the US with Pearl Harbor. And it was justified by the context, that there was no alternative way to end the war except by sacrificing a million Americans (and killing even more Japanese); so the use of the bomb was a vastly lesser evil. (This argument purports to meet comprehensive and demanding criteria for justifying the undertaking of a lesser evil; though many of the

Page 2 premises happen to be false).

One use of nuclear weapons is widely regarded as legitimate: retaliating in kind to a nuclear attack on one's own country. (The Catholic bishops have rejected even this if retaliating "in kind" involved direct attacks on cities. But most Americans, including probably most Catholics, currently disagree; and disagree even more when it comes to threatening such retaliation, a threat which they regard as both justified and having no adequate substitute). Thus, preparing and threatening such retaliation is seen as unquestionably legitimate, even obligatory for the US. Of course, such capabilities carry with them the ability to threaten or attack non-nuclear countries. And, with great risk, the ability to do so to nuclear antagonists as well: a threat and readiness that is explicit, for example, in the case of the defense of NATO.

"Insiders" in the bureaucracy controlling nuclear weapons have always seen another use for them as well: "limiting damage" and achieving a military/political outcome better than the worst possible, "in case deterrence fails": in the event that a nuclear war occurs for whatever reason. Use against military targets, and in particular the "decapitation" of the enemy command and control system, along with the destruction of the industrial, "war-supporting" base, has always been thought to be instrumental to achieving military objectives in nuclear war. The first two of these tasks are highly "time-urgent"; they must be carried out before most or any of the enemy forces have left enemy bases. There is an enormous premium in striking the first blow, "preemptively." (And preparation even to carry out these tasks "second," as "second-strike damage-limiting," is virtually indistinguishable, in appearance and readiness, from preparation to preempt. Even a high alert state for counterforce forces, needed for second-strike damage-limiting, serves to reduce tactical warning to the opponent of one's preemption).

This readiness to "limit damage," which is likely to be and at any rate to appear as readiness to preempt, in turn reinforces the credibility of threats to initiate strategic nuclear warfare, as an escalation of conflict with a strategically armed nuclear opponent, if that opponent is also equipped with the ability to escalate or preempt. After all, the circumstances in which one would rely on such a threat and would want it to be credible would almost surely involve some apprehension that such an opponent would itself escalate or preempt, so that damage-limiting capabilities would appear relevant, and an incentive to get in the first blow. This effect on the credibility of threats undergirding "extended deterrence" (detering actions other than a nuclear attack on the US, protecting US interests overseas) could even be the main purpose of efforts to achieve wartime damage-limiting, efforts which no longer offer high promise of being effective in the event of actual nuclear war. (See Star Wars; and the op ed connecting it with the threat of preemption by Forney Stark and Greg Weaver in the Oakland Tribune, November 8, 1985:

Page 3 almost the only instance in print of "my" argument by someone else.)

Is it legitimate to threaten, and thus to prepare, what it is not legitimate to do? Catholic doctrine says "no"; but most Americans clearly believe "yes," where the circumstances are sufficiently pressing and the alternatives inadequate. And most of them recognize that threats and preparations carry some risk of being eventually implemented—even irrationally, illegitimately, without authoritative decision—just by virtue of their existence, in the heat of a crisis, even though their existence was justified only in terms of pure bluffing. That is probably the basis of Americans' residual apprehension about nuclear war, along with fear of initiation by "Qaddafi" or other new nuclear leaders "less inhibited than either US or Soviet leaders by considerations of morality (US) or prudence (US and Soviet)."

The risks of nuclear war have always seemed to me greater, the pathways to nuclear war more numerous and less obstructed, than they appeared to most members of the American public and to elites, because I have been more aware of the role that nuclear threats have played in our foreign policy, of the nature of our readiness and preparations to carry them out, and above all, of the difference between the Insiders' and the public's appreciation of both the risks and the legitimacy of carrying out these threats.

World War II strategic bombing decisively changed the attitudes of top civilian and military officials toward the legitimacy of direct attacks upon civilians or of large-scale "collateral damage" to civilians in the course of attacks on military targets: toward what Lewis Mumford called, "The Morals of Extermination" (Atlantic, 1960?). This experience, and their sense that it was justified (and at least in the case of Japan, effective; and that it could have been effective in Germany, with better targeting, and certainly with atomic weapons) wiped out in their minds the moral relevance of the distinction between military and civilian targets and the traditional prohibition against indiscriminate or deliberate destruction of "innocents." This left prudential but no longer legitimacy barriers to the consideration of actual (as well as threatened) initiation of nuclear war.

The public (as polls have recently indicated) has endorsed threats to initiate—at least for certain high-stakes cases, mainly the defense of Europe—and therefore, preparations that make these threats credible (and even, lack of preparations for alternatives: especially applauded by European governments) but regards the carrying out of such threats, if they failed to deter, as intolerably reckless and even questionably legitimate. But officials administering this policy have always included some who regarded carrying out these threats as less reckless, more effective, more prudent compared to alternatives, than the public believed or could even imagine that anyone believed, and as unquestionably legitimate, "for reasons of state."

Page 4 Systems analysts often regard questions of "legitimacy" as irrelevant if not meaningless, but in any case foreign to the consideration of "rational choice," or the calculated pursuit of interest. But this betrays a "Robinson Crusoe" orientation: i.e., the perspective of a single human decision-maker, whose values are assumed fixed and known, without subordinates, superiors or a constituency, without allies or adversaries. When more realistic complexity of structure is recognized, the category of "legitimacy"—what is permitted, or forbidden, to be considered or chosen, on grounds of morality, legality, character/integrity—can be discovered to be highly relevant to prudential concerns, in particular the avoidance of disaster.

When one recognizes the possibility that officials may take actions against the desires and interests of their superiors or of their constituents, one sees an interest in reducing this risk. There is a potential price to doing this by placing certain actions entirely outside bounds, by forbidding them under any circumstances, declaring them "criminal" or immoral, not to be considered; the price, or risk, is that these actions will not be considered in circumstances when they would, after all (perhaps unforeseeably) serve all the relevant interests better than any alternatives, when they would constitute a "lesser evil." [Thus, precisely those systems analysts at RAND who, as economists, were devotees of pure competition and the free market, were strongly biased against proscriptions that might ban what would otherwise be the "optimal" choice. The pure competition model, though apparently social, actually shares many characteristics with the Robinson Crusoe model.]

But where catastrophic errors are possible, there is a strong case for erecting as many barriers to it as possible: and authoritative judgments of immorality or illegality, "violations of integrity or fundamental identity or group membership" that effectively exclude the potentially catastrophic choice from consciousness or active consideration as an "option" are the most powerful barriers possible. This is especially true—compared to relying on the perceived imprudence or dangerous consequences of such an option rationally compared to alternatives—under urgent, desperate crisis circumstances when judgments of consequences and the practicality of alternatives may be highly erratic, almost random, or warped by fear and other emotions. Better, as an assurance that a possibly catastrophic course will not be chosen, that it not be physically available or feasible at all: i.e., that no preparations have been made for it, because even the threat of it has been ruled out as impermissible. And if it is, nevertheless, "objectively" feasible, better that it not be thought of, discussed, weighed and considered, at all: because it is "unthinkable." (Does Herman Kahn, in "Thinking About the Unthinkable," or elsewhere, ever lay out the reasons systematically for not doing so: i.e., for allowing and using the category of "Unthinkable"?)

October 18, 2000

\my docs\draft\What I Learned

For a number of years after reading it in 1961, I accepted the perspective of Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power. Neustadt's thesis was that the power of the president is effectively hemmed in and often thwarted by the maneuverings, secrecy and deceptions of various bureaucratic agencies nominally subordinate to him in the Executive branch. These pursue parochial interests that are different from his and from any reasonable conception of national interest. The president, Neustadt argued, was the best or only representative of that national interest. And that was best served by enhancing the effective power of the president within the Executive branch, by improving the information available to him, and by White House tactics and practices that gave him alternative courses of action and kept his options open till it was advantageous for him to make a choice.

My early years of experience within the realm of secrecy seemed to give many examples of the validity of this perspective. I found major plans, practices and studies unknown to and deliberately withheld from higher authority, for careerist or bureaucratic reasons, that raised the possibility of extremely dangerous errors by the president as a result of his ignorance. [The missile gap; over-estimation of Soviet ground forces, leading to reliance on nuclear weapons; delegation of authority to initiate nuclear war by the previous president, and by higher commands to lower on a basis unknown to the president; basing of nuclear weapons offshore Iwakuni, concealed from the SecDef; war plans concealed from the SecDef and the President; studies of major command and control problems, concealed from the SecDef; violations of the two-man rule on nuclear weapons, and of positive control procedures, and resistance to PALs for undisclosed reasons reflecting distrust of the president's readiness to rely on nuclear weapons in crises (perceived, correctly, as different from that of the JCS).

Thus I was confirmed (by Korea, Berlin, Taiwan Straits, Cuba I leading, it seemed, via weak response (rather than, via "tough" covert action and secret preparations for invasion!) to Cuba II, both in a Cold War stance and an acceptance of the primacy and legitimacy of Presidential Power. The combination led to a focus on the Executive branch, and within it, the legitimate enhancement of Presidential Power, a sense of one's highest duty being to the President. The Cold War legitimized secrecy. But the focus on the president led to ambivalence about the the secrecy system. It legitimized secrecy from the Soviet Union, and even from Congress and the public (because of their parochial tendencies, as well as for the habit of Congress to leak to the public and the Soviet Union). But it made me aware of costs and dangers of secrecy within the Executive branch, so far as these resulted in inadequate or misleading information flowing to the president. This led me fairly early on to be willing to violate the strict rules of the secrecy system (which were often abused or violated for parochial bureaucratic reasons) in order to serve the nominal (and for me, actual) higher mission of the Executive branch as a whole, to serve the purposes of the president.

(I was not as yet aware of possible conflicts--which Neustadt and later the Kennedy School analysts did not alert me to foresee--between the president's sense of his own

interests and of the nation's interests (which presidents tend to see as harmonious in virtually all circumstances, just as lower heads of departments do) and the interests of the country, the Constitution, democracy, or the ability of Congress to perform an important, constructive role.) In other words, I already saw certain aspects of secrecy practices as being problematic, part of the problem, in keeping essential information from the president or his immediate advisors. And I saw (in the PSALM case in the Cuban Missile Crisis) that secrecy imposed by the president himself could contribute to this problem, leading to his own misinformation (which I still saw as the crucial problem). To the extent that presidential insistence on reports of "progress" in Vietnam and on suppressing evidence--such as an increasing Order of Battle of the NLF--that contradicted it resulted in the president himself being misled, there may have been a similar situation under LBJ in Vietnam. (I'm still not sure how important this phenomenon was under Johnson before Tet--certainly not as much as the CBS report concluded-- but it probably did play some role.)

This perspective encouraged you--if you wished conscientiously to serve your country's interest, not merely your own or that of a particular agency--to think of yourself, at whatever part of the bureaucracy you found yourself, as working ultimately for the president. That meant being ready to get relevant information to the president, or to those heads of departments who worked directly for him and could be expected to share his perspective more truly than those further down in the chain, when that information was being deliberately withheld from them and him by one's colleagues or immediate bosses or other agencies because it wouldn't serve their immediate, narrow interests for higher-ups to know it.

It might be that a problem could only be solved at a higher level, perhaps by making more resources available. But to inform higher authorities of the existence of the problem could endanger jobs and careers at the lower level, or threaten the budget or programs of a lower agency, because that would reveal failures, mistakes, earlier misstatements or wrong forecasts or suggest incompetence or insubordination. Being loyal above all to the president, through him to the country, meant being willing to by-pass channels to inform him against the wishes of one's boss or agency and thus at great risk to one's own career. (There might appear some small, and largely illusory, chance of being protected and even rewarded for this by the president or his immediate subordinates, so that doing this was a high-risk gamble in terms of career, not a pure sacrifice. But realistically, such whistle-blowing should be based on feelings of a higher loyalty, not on hopes of career-enhancement).

Thus, I risked my career at RAND (and offered to resign, if necessary, rather than to change my practices) by informing the SecDef and the White House of all the bureaucratic secrets mentioned above, potentially angering the Air Force (and the Navy). Moreover, in the case of the missile gap, my colleagues and I did see, in 1958-60, the "invincible ignorance" of the President himself as part of the problem, with the Air Force (and RAND) closer to a true perception of the national interest. (Similar perceptions actually trigger and legitimize many of the bureaucratic maneuvers described above). In this case, we sought to remedy the situation by educating the public (Wohlstetter's Foreign Affairs article) and a rival candidate for office, JFK, in 1960. (Our perspective on this was mistaken--except for

our warning about the missile gap, contrary to most of RAND's messages--based on faulty intelligence, especially from the Air Force).

But in two instances, my efforts in the early Sixties were analogous to my release of the Pentagon Papers--to the public, as "highest authority, sovereign"-- at the end of the decade. My "obsession" in 1960-61 was to get a particular document--the JSCP--into the hands of higher authority, the president, or at least the Secretary of Defense. And in the course of my Crisis Study, I tried to get the WSEG studies into the hands of the Secretary of Defense. (Both of these efforts failed!) In Vietnam, my job was to get information from lower levels of the military and civilian advisory effort to the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador, information otherwise withheld from them within channels. My first work for Nixon and Kissinger was to get information to them, via NSSM-1, that would normally be blocked from them by bureaucratic practices (information on disagreement among agencies, and on the views of agencies that did not have primary operating responsibility in a particular area).

But what Vietnam taught me, both in the Pentagon in 1964-65 and from the Pentagon Papers, was that the President was part of the problem, part of the country's problem. I learned that secrecy and lies by the president, deceiving Congress and the public and keeping them ignorant and passive, were as or even more dangerous to the national interest (and to very many lives) as was secrecy and lies to the president.

If this was to be remedied at all, it could only be a better-informed and alerted, agitated, mobilized Congress and media and public. Would Congress ever be willing to take on the responsibility of recapturing from the Executive and exercising its Constitutional role with respect to the war power? That question has not yet been fully answered; certainly there is resistance in Congress--and not much pressure from the public--to doing that. Yet I was sure that Congress would not do this, and would not make the effort to demand better information from the Executive, unless it had an awareness of the problem closer to what I had gained by access within the Executive branch. To move them to challenge the secrecy of the Executive and to assure themselves better information, they would have to be given a great deal of currently-withheld information, it would have to be forced on them, to make them aware just how badly the country's interests were being served by the current system (which effectively excluded them from information and influence). If someone were going to inform them of that, it looked like it had to be me, if I were willing, even before I had reached this understanding of the challenge, in 1970-71.

(The purpose of my leaks in 1968 was somewhat different, aimed at influencing the president's decision by denying him the prospect of deciding in secret. Even in 1969, my purpose was to influence the president's choice by publicly discrediting the process by which the national "commitment" had arisen, and by enabling him not only to share blame for a national "defeat" but to dump it primarily on his political rivals, my own party. As Walt Rostow conjectured about the source of the Papers, I was definitely not acting as a "good Democrat," putting the interests of the Democratic Party above all else, or identifying the national interest with the interests of the Party. It was not till late November, 1969, that I saw the president as so committed that only an unprecedented initiative by Congress could

extricate us: which would require pressure from the public as well as new information to Congress and the public. As it worked out, neither Congress nor the public acted on the basis of the information in the Papers to change the president's policy directly; the McGovern-Hatfield vote failed in June, 1971, and the Administration was fairly easily able to keep it from passing later, till US troops were withdrawn. But the President's fear that I might have more relevant documentation to reveal to this effect led him to act criminally at home (against me, in particular) in ways that, once revealed, did make Congress willing to enforce restraints on his foreign policy and made him too weak to sustain a veto against them. (His acts against me, rather reasonably stimulated, from his perspective, by my release of the Papers along with his knowledge that I had copied other documents and that various former and current NSC staffers might be moved to leak to me or others, played a major role in the second of only three impeachment proceedings against an American president. This was not a context in which his presidential power was adequate to executing an unpopular escalation, however much he and Kissinger saw it as necessary to the national interest. No wonder that Neustadt, who seems not to have changed his own perspective decisively, has never resumed his friendship with me. As Haldeman very perceptively saw it, the Papers (like Nixon's own subsequent acts in response to their release!) strongly undermined the belief that the president was always right and that his power and authority was legitimately supreme in foreign affairs.

(Consider--as almost no one does--why Nixon wanted to discredit me as an antiwar leader, from 1971 on. Why should he care about the antiwar movement at all? Especially after July 15, when his China trip is announced? The movement was no obstacle at all to his policy or his administration, except in moments of escalation. (And even then, during Laos, I don't recall a big problem; just a lot of complaining). The point was, he and Kissinger still foresaw the possibility, even probability, of future escalation (see Halperin's predictions, as late as May, 1972). Even this, so long as it didn't involve US troops (as Cambodia did), wasn't much of a danger for him domestically, as the reaction in May, 1972 showed: unless the role of nuclear threats were revealed, or a pattern of endless US air support and bombing could be forecast. (As Bundy points out in Foreign Affairs, he and Kissinger took care to conceal this prospect in January and February of 1973, for all their talk subsequently that they took this for granted as obviously necessary). I suspect both of these were worrying them about me as late as 1972, as well as in 1971. (Might they still have been worried about the "Brookings documents" perhaps on Nixon's role in 1968? It would have discredited both Nixon and Thieu in 1972; and he couldn't afford to discredit Thieu any more than himself). NSSM-1 itself, which I was clearly putting out through Gravel, would suggest forethought to the mining of Haiphong. (Anything else? Look at summary carefully), and discredit Vietnamization. But he would still worry more about other documents I might have (see the Talking Points! Or Duck Hook.) And above all, about nuclear threats (which I believe he was making on May 1: and according to Haig, intended to rely on after the total withdrawal of US troops, as a guarantee against overwhelming invasion that ARVN couldn't handle even with US air support! (New thought). (If I'm right that they not only used such a threat in May, 1972, but felt it had been very effective, that would reinforce their readiness to rely on it after the Paris Accords; just as Nixon's belief that such threats had been actually effective before--in Indochina (on the location of the DMZ and the

signing of the Accords), in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits, and (according to LBJ) in the Cuban Missile Crisis--was crucial to his belief that it would work in 1969.

2/18/2005 9:53 PM

Strange Love

America's Fatal Attraction to Nuclear Threats

For sixty years every American president has maintained his freedom to initiate nuclear warfare at a time and place of his own choosing.

The military, nuclear and foreign policies of each administration since 1945 has reflected an official view that American security and global interests require the president to be able to make credible threats of US *first-use* of nuclear weapons in various possible conflicts: and to carry out such threats, if necessary, with minimal risk of retaliation by the countries targeted or their nuclear-armed allies.

No president has rejected this doctrine, either publicly, or in private exchanges with allies or adversaries, or in official, classified documents or orally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (whatever the closely-held private opinions of some of them may have been). On the contrary, every one has had occasion, usually repeatedly, to assert his right to launch nuclear attacks, at his own discretion, in a wide variety of circumstances, and his *commitment* to do so in certain circumstances, including, for each of them, a conventional attack on Western Europe.

[In short: present the argument of Call to Mutiny.

The readiness to make the threats is not just hypothetical or rhetorical. Each president—with the possible exception of Ford (in office only...)—has either made such a threat of imminent possible first-use, or has participated in official discussions, or presented with high-level recommendations, of imminent threat, consideration, or execution of a nuclear “option” in an ongoing, immediate crisis. [That was true through Carter. Is it true for Reagan?! Bush I (Gulf War). (Clinton: Libya). Bush II: Iraq.]

Usually secret threats: *because* the threat would seem inappropriate to much of the world and the US public, and carrying it out too risky (it would be done as a *fait accompli*) (See Ike comment to Dulles).

But beyond Call to Mutiny: This is the reason for pursuing Superiority. These threats are not merely convenient, or necessary, to make our current foreign policy seem feasible. It is the possibility of making such threats, credibly, that accounts for our ambitious, expansive foreign policy outside the Western Hemisphere; without that possibility [say, if nuclear weapons had not been invented, or if there had been, or emerged, effective arms control neutralizing these weapons and threats, or if there were no advantage to first-strike over second-strike or in tactical nuclear weapons] our foreign policy would have to have been, or become, very different: in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Atomic diplomacy failed in the summer and fall of 1945. But the rearming of West Germany, the division of Germany and Europe, the status of Berlin, the unique contribution of the US to European “defense” and thus the role of the US as a “European” power with claims on European political and economic policies would be infeasible. The exclusion of the Soviet Union from military intervention in the Middle East (Iran and Turkey in particular), and limitation of its influence in the Middle East, would be infeasible. Prevention of unification of Vietnam—and of Communist control of Laos and Cambodia-- from 1954 to 1975 would have been infeasible. (The latter, I conjecture, was important mainly for domestic political reasons, after the “fall” of China; as was, prevention of the unification of Korea).

Another reason for choosing superiority (and this foreign policy): government subsidy to aerospace industry and other military-scientific enterprise; with advantages to the local US regions benefiting from this, and their politicians.

Among the costs, aside from several trillion current dollars (mainly of “waste”):

--no possibility of agreed restraint on Soviet build-up, eventually constituting a very dangerous threat to American security, indeed, world survival.

i.e., arms control policy was essentially a hoax; the pursuit of superiority was of higher priority, and totally blocked real progress toward either disarmament or stability.

--non-proliferation policy was doomed to fail, with the material and psychological basis for breakdown of the NP-regime proceeding steadily over the last fifty years. Again, the determination to maintain superiority conflicted fatally with the requirements of averting proliferation. This was foreseen, and superiority (allowing first-use threats maintaining indirect American empire up to the borders of the Soviet Bloc and China) always had higher priority.

Thus, n-p policy was also a hoax. Like the war on drugs; the war on poverty; and now, the war on terror. (The first two fell victim to the war on Vietnam/Laos; the war on drugs later was sabotaged by indirect wars in Central America, then direct war on Afghanistan. The war on terror was undermined by war on Iraq (war for oil and Israel).)

The problem of maintaining this policy after about 1967, when the Brezhnev buildup achieved something close to parity. As HAK asked, “What could superiority mean at these levels?” But in place of superiority: a first-strike *threat*—not a real “disarming” capability in the earlier sense, but a “threat of preemption, or inadvertent attack, false alarm, threat of ‘loss of control’: to make escalation look dangerous to the other side. This applied to both sides, especially against an attack directly on the other’s homeland. A true game of chicken. (unlike the 50’s and 60’s!) But this instability could still favor the side that was willing to risk the first move, if it was a limited move against a non-nuclear or to disarm a much weaker nuclear state (e.g. China in the 60’s). The Soviets were not likely to have any occasion to do this; their direct empire was maintained by

great superiority in conventional forces. (Cuba was an attempted exception). Our indirect empire was the one that “required” first-use threats.

Instead of superiority, we could rely on mutual instability to deter the Soviets from matching our first-use against others, either at our initial level or at somewhat higher levels of escalation.

The essential thing was to have a capability to *reduce* markedly the damage we would suffer by striking first compared to striking second. Decapitation, counterforce capability, and ABM could offer that. They couldn’t match us in counterforce against submarines, or in ABM: so our “critical risk” (!) could look lower. (Nevertheless, it still looked questionable to rely on this, *beyond* the first stage of first-use against a TW opponent. Though see Carter in Iran, 1980! Or against Iraq, 1991 (still an SU). Probably this could have been abandoned, except that it was so profitable for the MIC! This was above all true ever since 1989, end of CW! Probably a major factor right along, as seen in 1961-62, end of missile gap).

One could well ask, what was really crucial about this foreign policy, ever: but especially after Stalin’s death!

Could it, after all, have been the desire to keep the SU entirely out of influence over Iran, or elsewhere in the Middle East, that made nuclear FU threats really important? (see Suez 1956, where Khrushchev tried to act as if our threats could be neutralized by his. And see Iraq/Kuwait in 1958: where the threat didn’t really involve the SU! Iran 1980; Gulf War 1991; TUCKER IN 1975: SEE IF STONE IN NYRB (tell his biographer!)

Also, our SUPPOSED “essential” role in Europe! (Another hoax! The 175 divisions! Like the bomber gap and the missile gap and the ABM gap, and the H-bomb gap (and the German bomb gap): the necessary enemy.

The US public couldn’t be told the real reasons for seeking superiority, or the reliance on FU threats. It would look too aggressive, too imperial, too dangerous: the public wasn’t ready for this during the Cold War. (Bush intended, and still intends, to shift paradigms on this, toward open empire, intervention, first-use; Iraq has raised a public challenge to this, but since the election it’s not clear he will be held back from this).

Instead, they were told that the Soviets were always on the verge of getting *superiority*: and that it would undoubtedly use this, if and when achieved, to blackmail us, attack us, and rule the world. (See the panic over Iraq or Iran getting nuclear weapons; now, North Korea, or Al Qaeda—there’s a real reason to worry!). They weren’t told that there was virtually no possibility of such Soviet superiority, and therefore no real effort by the Soviets to attain it.

They were told that what we couldn’t abide was parity (or real MAD: McN was obscurantist about this). They weren’t told that our superiority—which we openly sought—was first-strike superiority, in order to threaten first-strike or first-use, and to

carry out first-use. Instead, they were told we needed superiority just to keep the Soviets from threatening first-strike or first-use or carrying it out: they were so hard to deter from expansion based on military power, or from first-strikes. (see AJW). (In reality, our military danger, and our possible need for first-use, was never from Soviet direct military expansion, aggression or preventive war, surprise attack. It was danger to our indirect empire by local or regional resistance to our puppet states, possibly encouraged (we exaggerated that) or more likely supported by the Soviets or Chinese. (Without that Soviet support, in materiel and money, it's probably true that we would not have needed first-use threats to suppress resistance in the Third World).

Kennan, advocate of containment, thought NFU was perfectly compatible with containment, and so was minimum deterrence. Though Nitze pointed out: Berlin (Kennan would probably have made a deal on that, as would Lippman) and IRAN. (Kennan would have let go of Indochina: see 1966 hearings). (Did Kennan comment on Truman's or Ike's FU threats over Korea, the next year, 1950/53? HAK and N thought we should have carried out attacks; as over Indochina.)

See the hidden controversy between Democrats/hst/JFK/McN/LBJ vs. Repubs Dulles/(Taft on China?), MacArthur, Ike/Twining/LeMay/Goldwater/Nixon/JCS: On nucs, tac nucs, CHINA, Indochina...

Dems may not have "believed" —and privately determined not to carry out FU threats—and they held back from the strongest recommendations of their hawks and JCS and Repubs—BUT they wouldn't formally reject even these recommendations, and all made essential concessions to their hawks, and maintained the policy in programs and assurances; and most—perhaps to their own surprise, or in a state of denial—did make use of the threats during their tenures. (Even Carter!)

Show differences. But similarities: especially marked in arms programs (even though USAF never got all it wanted from Dems). We could be in worse shape than we are now, if worst serious recommendations had been followed; indeed, we could easily have had both limited nuclear wars and all-out wars; and proliferation could have gone even further, with even less resistance by us; and there could be more deployed weapons: all these, serious possibilities (even likelihoods!) if our policies had been even worse.

But no president has come close to doing what he could and should have done to reduce long-run dangers; most have taken unconscionable, stunning short-run risks unnecessarily; all have contributed to catastrophic long-run dangers, in active ways. Same for Soviets. And to a much lesser extent, all other nuclear states; and determinedly virtual nuclear states. NO state or official has done all that he or she could and should have done, or anywhere near it. An international, indeed human species, failure, or worse: an active course toward speciecide (multiple). (Term needs inventing!)

It is not a coincidence that we have led the way in all this, and remain predominantly responsible for continuing the dangers. Not really that we are more bloody-minded, more irresponsible by nature or history. Our technical and geographical position disposed us to

rely on airpower; we are the only nation in history to have tried to win a war by airpower. More ominously, we are the only national in history that believes we *did* win a war by airpower, as an indispensable element of victory: in Germany, and in Japan.

In both those campaigns, we followed the Germans (to a less extent, the Japanese) and the British in abandoning the moral/legal code of protecting civilians from deliberate attack. We were the only party in World War II that had the ability to develop atomic weapons in time for use in that supreme conflict; we chose to keep the war going (rejecting measures that had a good chance of ending it sooner) long enough to use them; and the circumstances of their use (simultaneous with Soviet entry, and given public ignorance that we knew the Japanese were prepared to negotiate a surrender on acceptable terms) gave an indelible impression that they had been totally effective and crucial in shortening the war and saving many American and even Japanese lives.

All these beliefs (all false) about the effects of bombing, terror bombing, and specifically nuclear bombing, have made us—along with the British--peculiarly, uniquely accepting of seeking victory through airpower, and specifically, victory through bombing of civilian or civilian “infrastructure” or at the cost of “collateral damage.” (It helps that we are one of the few major nations that has never been bombed: until Oklahoma City and 9-11!)

It may be misleading to suggest that all or most Americans “love” bombing of any kind, least of all nuclear bombing.

But officials and former officials, and the American Establishment in a fairly broad sense, has been wedded to the necessity of nuclear threats for sixty years: and the broader public has been either tolerant and accepting of this, or easily persuaded of the necessity, and/or quite easily kept in the dark about the threats, the policy, or any dangers associated with it. “Love” is no doubt too strong a term for the latter, public attitudes. But there has always been an important gap between public and elite attitudes on nearly every aspect of this (*except* for a near-universal acceptance of the need for technical, airpower and nuclear “superiority” in some rough sense).

For the elite attitudes, especially those of a highly influential minority of civilian advisors, politicians, military commanders, and nuclear scientists, it is not too much to speak of an obsession, an almost hallucinatory fantasy, surely an infatuation, an unwholesome preoccupation, with the necessity and efficacy of nuclear threats. A strange kind of love.

(And—nothing strange about this-- a very important and influential part of our industry loves the profits that go with making these threats “credible”: a very expensive undertaking. And they don’t mind at all when an arms race with a powerful opponent makes it ever more expensive: the taxpayers’ money goes to them. Part of that goes, in turn, to politicians in select but widely-distributed districts, and to their constituents. And the Services, above all the Air Force, benefit by “preparedness” for wars “that must never be fought and can never be won.” As well as for wars that can’t be won, but are fought

anyway, in the belief that the shadow of nuclear weapons will keep them from being lost (Korea after Inchon, and Vietnam) and wars that can be won if the shadow of nuclear weapons deter the use of WMDs against us (the Gulf War: and the initial phase of the Iraq War; earlier, the Cuban Missile Crisis).

Sunday, February 13, 2005
 2:56 PM
 nuc book/ what needs telling?

What do I know—from my classified work, and subsequent study—that the public has never learned or doesn't understand—which is still timely and urgent, in terms of foreseeing current dangers both from US nuclear policy and the behavior of new nuclear states, and for the prospects of proliferation?

1. The USG always thought of nuclear weapons in terms of combat use, not merely deterrence. (It was some of the initial scientists, like Rotblat (and some others, according to the Goodchild book on Teller) who believed their use should and would be used only to deter German use; others saw that the USG would “have” to use the weapon to shorten the war, to avoid political reproach.)

This held for use against Germany; then against Japanⁱⁱⁱ; then against Russia. In the case of Russia, the threat of first strike was, indeed, to deter Soviet armies from conventional attack against West Europe: or, e.g., against Iran (Nitze to Acheson and Kennan, 1949: concern for Middle East oil. See Foreign Affairs ref.)

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2. After November, 1944, by which time the US realized that there was no German program, the highest US deliberations always contemplated or threatened US first-use (FU) against a non-nuclear state: except for the case of the Soviet Union after late 1949. After Japan, there were FU threats against Russia over northern Iran (1946) and over Berlin (1948), against Korea and China (1950: Russia still essentially non-nuclear despite one test.
3. After that, the targets of our threats were either nuclear-armed (Russia) or allied to Russia (China, 1954, 1958), Korea (1953), DRV (1954), DRV/China (1955-60), Laos/China (1961), Soviet Union (1961, 1962), DRV (1964, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973-74). An exception was Iraq over Kuwait (1958).

Thus:

4. After 1950, the US couldn't seriously contemplate—or credibly threaten—to launch a nuclear attack, either tactical or strategic, without strong reason for confidence that the Soviets would not respond with nuclear weapons, to defend against or retaliate to US nuclear attack on themselves or their ally. That meant that to make any nuclear threat at all, the US had to have a reliable ability to disarm the Soviet nuclear capability altogether, to make it unlikely that the Soviets could strike second at all against the US homeland, and very highly unlikely that their retaliation, if any, could be massive. Only with such a capability—an overwhelming first-strike capability—could the US plan, or even appear to be confident, that it could hit a third-world ally of the Soviet Union with

nuclear weapons without being paralyzed from doing so by the fear of possible Soviet retaliation, either locally or limited strategic reprisal. What could give it that confidence would be the threat that such a retaliation would be suicidal for the SU; it would be unacceptably likely, if not certain, to result in escalation to a strategic first-strike by the US.^{iv}

5. Therefore: US strategic nuclear plans were first-strike plans, not “second strike” plans designed either for retaliation against a Soviet nuclear first strike (FS) against the US or to deter such an attack.^v In retrospect, the Soviets *never* had the capability for a plausible disarming first strike against the US, *nor* the intention of attempting to acquire it.^{vi}

US posture and policies were premised upon maintaining a radical asymmetry between Soviet and US nuclear capabilities. Functionally, US nuclear superiority in strategic forces was intended to allow the US to extend a “nuclear umbrella” to US allies or clients both in Europe and in the Third World, principally Asia and the Middle East. That is, the US offered (with or without invitation) to reply to an overwhelming conventional attack by Soviet, Chinese, Warsaw Pact or Soviet client forces on US allies or clients with a limited but devastating first-use nuclear attack with US tactical or strategic forces. That was meant to deter any conventional attack, or at least, its escalation to levels that would overwhelm local allied and perhaps US conventional forces.

At the same time, the US strategic superiority was designed to prevent the Soviets from extending a comparable, or even a more limited, nuclear “umbrella” (or even a plausible conventional umbrella) over its allies or potential clients. Not only was it to be impossible for the Soviets to contemplate offering or carrying out a threat of Soviet first-use to protect their allies in a conventional conflict (for fear of a US strategic disarming attack: or at least, a heavy limited nuclear response, in confidence that it would not be responded to in kind for fear of escalation to a US first-strike. They could not even promise credibly to reply in kind to a limited first-use of nuclear weapons against their ally: i.e. they could not offer a reliable nuclear “umbrella” even against US nuclear attack, let alone against the kind of conventional attack the US first-use threat was designed to deter.

The declared need for this asymmetry—this US superiority—in nuclear capabilities and threats was to offset a contrary asymmetry in conventional forces, “threatening” the borders of our allies and client states. This supposed need rested on two premises, one of them physically obvious. That was that many of these allies and clients literally shared a border with the Soviet Union, China, or the Warsaw Pact countries essentially occupied by Soviet forces: and all of these latter countries of the “Sino-Soviet bloc” maintained very much larger or more effective conventional forces than their neighbors. That was a fact. The second premise was that the Soviet Union and China lusted to expand into these neighboring countries, either by armed invasion (like Hitler or Japan) or by subversion and intimidation in the shadow of a threat of invasion (as in the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia). The two together implied that the expansion of Soviet and Chinese tyranny could be deterred only by the prospect of a US-supplied nuclear defense.

For the reasons spelled out above, that required a credible US disarming first-strike capability to deter Soviet-supplied nuclear responses to US first-use.^{vii}

But why did the US need to be so concerned about the possibility of Soviet expansion either by armed attack or intimidation, in all of these countries around the world? In the case of Western Europe, that seemed to answer itself. (return to this) But why elsewhere?

The declared reasons: ...(which created some “realities,” in terms of domestic politics and the expectations of our adversaries and allies, once the declarations were presented and the commitments and investments made). Freedom; appeasement and encouragement; dominos and ultimately large stakes; bases and listening posts; containment; (for Ike, roll-back, in campaign);

But why take on commitments to conventional help and nuclear threats right up to the entire border of the Soviet Union and China?!

Because in the case of Iran and the Middle East: OIL. Cuba 1961-62 and *Turkey*: domestic politics and perceived balance of power (maintenance of asymmetry of strategic power and “rights”). In Central and Latin America: sphere of influence (plantations). Vietnam: (hst, 1945-48, relations with France, Britain and Germany; then, for hst after 1949 and Ike, JFK and LBJ (1953-68), domestic politics; under Nixon, triangular international relations, and domestic politics.

5. Unknown both to public and RAND: enormous US superiority, in objective capability, persisted for 20 years into the nuclear era, not merely 5 or 6 years. This reflected secret US knowledge of extremely inferior Soviet forces in scale and in vulnerability. (It was also true that the disparity in favor of Soviet conventional forces facing Europe, if any, was secretly known to be very much less than NATO official estimates).
6. Therefore, USG willingness to contemplate US FU—*if necessary*—to maintain US dominance in countries on the border of the Sino-Soviet Bloc was very much greater than the public and public elites imagined, and greater than the USG saw fit to make public.

A number of threats were made, secretly, not at all pure bluffs. And these were less reckless than the public would have supposed, if they had become aware of them without sharing the USG secret knowledge of the real strategic balance. Nevertheless, they were in fact extremely dangerous, from a global and long-run point of view; and even bore real risks, despite the balance, of triggering an all-out strategic exchange which would have been catastrophic for the Northern Hemisphere for reasons of which the US was totally ignorant at the time and for the next generation. (Compare the uncertainties surrounding atmospheric ignition, and Fermi’s last-minute worries about unrecognized environmental effects. That wasn’t a reality in 1945; it was a near-certainty from 1956 till 1983.)

Estimates of the probability or possibility of disaster arising from the Cuban Missile Crisis (or the Berlin Crisis of the previous year) have fluctuated greatly since 1962. Not till the Eighties (and ever since) was it recognized that likelihood of all-out nuclear catastrophe was extremely high. And I am aware (from my study in 1964) for reasons never published before that it was even higher, we were closer to war, than any account has so far estimated. (That may also have been true of the Berlin Crisis). (Ironically, the resolution of the Berlin Crisis, for the short-run, in 1961, probably contributed to the emergence of the Cuban Crisis the next year, for reasons to which I, inadvertently, contributed significantly. (I long thought that my actions in 1961—sometimes alluded to historically but never accurately—contributed significantly to the ending of the Berlin Crisis. Apparently, as Sy Hersh has shown, I was wrong about that. I never thought I contributed to the resolution of the Cuban Crisis, nor did I. But very regrettably, I have to conclude that I did contribute measurably in 1961 to the fact that the Cuban Crisis arose in 1962. And my 1964 study of that crisis revealed to me how close that came to destroying civilization in the Northern Hemisphere, at least.

Another aspect of that Crisis was that it involved Khrushchev's consciously imitating US FU threats in Europe over the previous decade, including a willingness to delegate authority to launch nuclear weapons as well as to deploy them on the borders of his superpower adversary.

END NOTES

ⁱ In the case of Japan, actual combat use was to “deter” the Japanese military from holding out for an explicit promise to keep the Emperor, or better, from their point of view, for a promise that they themselves would not be tried by the Allies for war crimes, or perhaps even that the US would not occupy Japan, or all of it. (Better thought of as “compellence”: of surrender on US terms, without an explicit promise of keeping the Emperor, or even an implicit promise until after the Bomb had been dropped, thus obscuring in American political debate the effect of the compromise of unconditional surrender demands. (see note iii below).

ii

ⁱⁱⁱ Compare: Nixon’s acceptance of the terms of a negotiated agreement, agreed to in October with the DRV, postponed until after the Christmas bombing, so that he would appear to have shot his way to a settlement that was presumably more favorable to us than could have been achieved earlier, without the attack, and as favorable as could be achieved.

Likewise, Bill Bundy proposed in October and November of 1964 that the US should go to Geneva and take whatever terms we could get as an agreement, but postpone proposing this till after one or two raids against the North, so that we could get the benefit of the above impression of “forcing” a settlement on the North, of not lacking any aggressiveness, of getting the best terms achievable, and of simply preempting an international demand for negotiations rather than being anxious to seek terms and avoid escalation on our own account. Others, specifically McNamara, may have thought that the initial attacks would actually enable us to get favorable, acceptable terms, and that Hanoi would press for negotiations to this effect without our having to appear to seek negotiations. But both were disappointed: Hanoi wouldn’t negotiate at all while we were bombing, and had no interest in making fundamental concessions, nor did the international community “force” us to get into talks by proposing them, nor was Johnson (or the JCS) willing to initiate talks on our own.

For their part, the North Vietnamese military believed that we would give better terms if negotiations started after we had “gotten a bloody nose” by suffering an NVA offensive: just as the Japanese Army believed they would do better after “one more big battle”: first, Okinawa, then, the initial landings in Japan. The DRV acted on this mistake twice: in Tet, 1968, and the Easter offensive in 1972, both times rejecting serious negotiations in advance of the offensive, suffering great losses for very little (though in 1968 they may have forestalled a US land invasion of NVN, though narrowly risking triggering it).

^{iv} [As I write this, I’m becoming aware of the fact that little of this was understood by me or by any of my RAND mentors in the decade of the Fifties, and even the Sixties. Despite our Top Secret clearances—indeed, largely because of them—they, and I, were in a state of ignorance about the true strategic balance, and about the understanding of that by the JCS and White House, and about the purposes of nuclear posture and the aims of US foreign policy that reflected high Administration thinking—that was different from

that of the public and elite commentators but was just as great, just as removed from the reality both of the balance and of US foreign and defense policy.

As a result, we didn't understand Administration motives or the real considerations shaping SAC posture. Our contempt for the shortcomings, "prejudices" and inefficiency, even "irrationality" of the policies and posture—in the light of what we supposed to be the relevant criteria and strategic aims (which we took to be either self-evident, or in line with Administration declarations)—was almost entirely misplaced. The true policies were indeed insanely reckless from a global and long-run perspective (e.g., they involved horrific short-run risks for our allies and many other countries, hostile or neutral; and they virtually ensured long-run proliferation, vertical and horizontal, with increasing risks for ourselves) but the dangers were quite different than the ones we obsessed about: the likelihood of "inviting" by our vulnerability a Soviet Pearl Harbor attack, a Soviet first strike out of the blue or in a conventional crisis.

I don't want to imply misleadingly that the picture I am giving is what I or any of my colleagues understood at the time. Nor is it the case that I can prove it conclusively with documents, either from the period or later, up till today. But I'm realizing that it would be largely a waste of time and readers' patience, indeed confusing overall, to explain at any length how it looked to us/me at the time and through the Sixties.

The most relevant aspect of that history (of the RAND delusions, in-between the delusions of the public and outside commentators and analysts, and the realities-plus-delusions of the JCS and SAC and the White House) would be to explain how someone both intelligent, concerned about morality, and with access to Top Secret information—myself, and my respected colleagues—could be brought to participate in plans that could clearly lead to the extermination of hundreds of millions of people, either by accident or by deliberate decisions of the President and top military leaders.

That explanation, at least briefly, is probably needed to keep readers paying attention to me at all: without inferring wrongly that I was, with my colleagues, a kind of monster who must be listened to with the greatest skepticism still today: and who was not representative of the kinds of officials who served, say, under Carter and Clinton or Russia today. And that's very relevant to understanding how others like ourselves could be—indeed, certainly are—participating in such planning today, both in the US and in every other nuclear state, perhaps especially in the newest ones.

For the rest of this outline, I'll assert the realities of the period from 1950 on as they were—as I understand them today, not as I saw them from RAND or even the Defense Department through the Sixties. (My real awareness began in late 1974, when I first learned that Richard Nixon had seriously planned nuclear first-use in Indochina in 1969; and then, by pursuing this lead, realized that first-use threat had been made repeatedly since 1946, and to the present. That changed my understanding of the seriousness, and purpose, of US strategic first-strike policies throughout the entire Cold War era and beyond.)]

^v (Not till the late Sixties did the Soviets begin to acquire a real capability for a damage-limiting preemptive attack, with prospects no more, though no less, insanely reckless than SAC was still pursuing in that period).

^{vi} For a period, about 1954-61, the Air Force (and RAND) and to some extent the CIA, did believe that the SU had both the intention and the probable capability to acquire such a force, and might even have acquired it by the end of that period. But even then, LeMay and his successor Power at SAC were confident that they would have adequate warning (by methods not known to RAND or the public) to preempt any attempt to launch the Soviet force, which they knew (by methods and to an extent not guessed by RAND or the public) to be highly vulnerable to a preemptive attack. Thus, even during this period, SAC and theater forces were really postured for a first strike, either in the context of escalation from an ongoing or impending theater conflict or of preemption. Thus, they took little account of possible vulnerability to a Soviet first-strike—RAND's preoccupation—for reasons never understood by RAND (i.e., me, or my mentors Wohlstetter, Rowen, et al, before), which found this neglect purely negligent, wishful, bureaucratically inert or ignorant.

During this period (I came to RAND in the midst of it, 1958) RAND, following USAF intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear buildup and even going beyond them, was greatly over-estimating Soviet strategic offensive forces and capabilities, and greatly underestimating (to the point of total neglect) Soviet vulnerabilities to a US first-strike.

^{vii} Prior to 1949-50, with a US nuclear monopoly, in principle the US could have credibly threatened first-use of tactical nuclear weapons to defeat any Soviet or satellite (e.g. North Korean or East German) conventional attack without fear of any nuclear response. In other words, there would have been no need to back up such a threat with a strategic capability against the Soviet Union. Indeed, MacArthur urged such an attack against Chinese forces in Korea, or against China itself, in the winter of 1950-51, and the JCS secretly considered possible targets for the President, who threatened such use openly. And Truman claimed to have made nuclear threats in 1946 to drive the Soviets out of northern Iran, and definitely made tacit threats to prevent a prolonged or effective Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948.

Yet, ironically, in none of these cases did the US get close to serious planning to use only tactical weapons against locally deployed Soviet forces, for the simple reason that the US had very few atomic weapons, and the JCS were reluctant to plan to subtract them from plans for strategic attack on the Soviet Union itself to use in a local conflict. By the time the US had a large inventory of nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons—about 1954—the Soviets had a significant enough arsenal themselves to make

it necessary to be able to disarm them inside the SU if the US were to contemplate using tactical weapons against Soviet forces or its allies anywhere.

Thus, US atomic weapons were directed entirely to use against the SU homeland before 1950, and almost entirely so through 1953, because the JCS and SAC believed they had barely enough weapons for that strategic purpose till then. And later, with vastly increasing numbers of weapons, they still needed to concentrate on SU and Warsaw Pact targets, to deter or prevent Soviet use of nuclear weapons in reply to possible US limited use of tactical weapons.

[December 26, 2006: Questions for Dan. Is problem in his view of the Eden book is her obsessive focus on the question as to why they don't include fire, as opposed to looking more closely than she does at the effects of fire, in terms of the calculations of people killed?]

Saturday, December 23, 2006

Lynn Eden, *The Whole World on Fire* (Cornell, 2004). DE comments. Eden discovered that from '45 to today, nuclear war planners haven't calculated effects of fire into nuclear war planning, targeting or calculations of consequences. She focuses, obsessively, on the question of why the planners in successive administrations have failed/refused to make these calculations, even when, as she discloses, a basis for predicting effects of fire as reliably as the effects of blast and prompt radiation was demonstrated in the 80s, 20 years ago. She examines many hypotheses as to why the organizations were so resistant to change their models and predictions, including the belief to this day that the effects of fire were too contingent on many factors, to unpredictable to be calculated, and were thereby ignored in planning. She demonstrates that this was never true, and particularly in the last 25 years.

But her interviews suggest the hypothesis that she doesn't really examine, that is that throughout this period, the planners and their bosses, the civilian officials, have worked hard to deny that the actual targets of their planned attacks ever were or are now, people. Her question starts from the observation that planning is based on the assumption that the desired effects of nuclear explosions are on structures or military bases and forces, including command posts. These of course have people in them but the target is described as being a base, a missile silo, or a command post. The notion that civilians or non-combatants are also hurt is described as collateral damage. [Go over earlier part]. Eden asks the question if it is truly undesired, why isn't their an interest in measuring the effects on victims so as to minimize it and she just doesn't really get an answer; a lack of interest.

Could be explained by indifference to the humans, contrary to the assertion that death is not regarded as an objective, but that this is actually an undesirable effect. A secret being hidden then might be that the planners and their bosses in reality simply don't care and are indifferent to these effects. But it is noticeable that the commanders she talks to always make the assertions that this has always been true, that populations and cities have never been the actual target. This is blatantly false historically, not only for WW II but for the first twenty years, at least, of the nuclear era, and thus very suspect even for the current period.

The fact that these commanders would make such egregiously false statements undercuts their assertions that civilian deaths are no longer an objective or undersired. P. 268, quotes an official in 1990 who explains why he clings to the belief that fire is unpredictable and "not quantifiable." "For other than population targets, which we don't attack, fire is almost a minor player."

She quotes from a long interview with Admiral Colley, the man in charge of targeting for the Strategic Air Command: "To the best of my knowledge, our country has

never had a stated policy of attacking cities or people.” At first glance, this is startlingly untrue and contradicted by the evidence of the early planning in Eden’s own book. The word stated may be critical here; it’s true that for statements to the public from the earliest days of strategic bombing, there has been a concerted effort by British and American officials to hide that they were targeting cities, urban areas. Colley himself goes beyond this lie to suggest what he calls an emotional or might better be called political reason for it. “At high policy levels they don’t like to think about this. We don’t like hitting cities, we don’t like killing people. So we have a policy of destruction, but hitting urban targets...[I don’t know what urban polygons means nor is this explained in the text.] “So we can tell the world, we don’t hit cities...Because they are military targets all over the world located in cities....” Lynn responds, “emotion.” Colley: “We’re not targeting cities and that makes us feel better. I call that emotion.”

Another official, echoing Colley’s logic though not tone: “If we meet our damage goals...then we don’t give a hoot if we incinerate everything in the area.” As Lynn Eden’s sources show, in particular, Harold Brode, for thermonuclear weapons, especially over 100 kilotons, “the area” is going to be much larger than the area containing the specific military targets which are supposedly the focus and the effects on which are the basis for choosing weapons and warplans. In fact, with mass fires, the area is going to be very much larger than the range of the blast effects that are calculated and the “everything” means above all people, everybody in this large area.

Let me go in a different mode here because that’s no good. In Eden, p. 46, General Curtis LeMay, who headed the strategic bombing campaign against Japan and major commander and creator of SAC later, explains what he meant by “military targets”: “there are no innocent civilians; it is their government and you are fighting their people...so it doesn’t trouble me so much to be killing innocent bystanders. Furthermore, we were going.... We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and kids when we burned that town. [LeMay to MacKinley Kantor, *Mission with LeMay*, 384]. “Had to be done...destroy the enemies potential...had to be erased...There’s nothing new about this massacre of civilian populations. [There was nothing new about deliberate massacre of civilians by military as of March 1945. First firestorm produced in Hamburg as of July ’43, killing perhaps some 60,000 civilians.].

Eden quotes Fred Reed: “a regular commentator on Air Force affairs, on “Hypocrisy and the Smithsonian,” commenting on criticisms of its exhibition of Enola Gay that year: “The notion that vaporizing Japanese cities...is immoral is pretty silly. What’s the difference between frying them with explosives and the atomic bomb. How many died in Germany? Mass killing of civilians was everyday stuff.”

Eden cites these quotations as evidence “that neither moral inhibitions nor psychological factors came into the consideration of these effects after the war.” “One should not overestimate of officers to enemy casualties in face of an imperative to win the war,” and thus she rejects such considerations as a reason why “air power organizations focused on blast rather than fire damage.” But she’s missing that although the officers themselves felt or claimed to feel no qualms and showed no qualms in their actions about inflicting or even thinking about such casualties, there was very much a perceived difference in the way that American civilians and others in the world would think about it, and therefore the incentive to describe these casualties as undesired, and to refuse to calculate them, for the same reasons officials and officers in the current Iraq

War have claimed that they do not calculate Iraqi's killed, either civilian or military. As Colin Powell has said, "We don't do body counts."

In early war planning, Eden quotes a high level SAC operations analyst, Stanley Lawwiil, that SAC analyst referred to early post-war planning as the "city busting phase"... "level Moscow if you can [p. 98]. "When only 25-30 in stockpile, drop them on city centers...horizontal target system...didn't care if there were churches, wanted to level town." Declassified war plans of 40s targets were designated only cities by name, starting with Moscow and proceeding essentially in order of population. They goal not only then but much later following LeMay's experience in WW II in Japan was to regard city bombing or "urban-industrial targets" as central to the war plan although as the Russians acquired increasing numbers of nuclear weapons, military targets had highest priority for initial destruction as long as major towns and cities like Moscow.

The emphasis was "to deliver the entire stockpile of atomic bombs...in a single massive attack." P. 99: "A navy captain who heard a briefing of the war plan in 1954 (a pre-H bomb plan) was "the final impression was that virtually all of Russia would be nothing but a virtual radiation ruin in less than 2 hours."

Note that it was within a few years of this plan that large numbers of H-bombs dropped by bombers had simply been fitted into this plan, that is, not only massively increasing the effects of fallout but the possibility of nuclear winter from smoke and dust not perceived until 1982 – and the certainty of mass fires, not calculated into the war plans, to this day, as Eden shows. But these quotations are enough to establish the falsity of the claims that cities were never the target of warplans. Only real difference in early days, with few weapons, they were the only targets. Later, strategic nuclear targets and Soviet military forces were added to plan; cities were never subtracted.

In the days when I was looking at war plans, in the late 50s and early 60s, there was no secret about this inside planning circles. Difference seems to have occurred, as it happens, under Nixon, who decreed that population per se was not to be the target of our attacks; but this effected only the description of the targeting not the actual impact, since by this time DGZ's, designated ground zeros, the aiming points for bombs in the war plan, were already focused on military targets, if any, in the vicinity of the cities.

There was no need even to change the DGZ's. The population incinerated would no longer be described as "bonus damage" or as the actual desired effect. The reason for the change under Nixon seems to have been his decision to finally ratify the Genocide convention in the 70s [check the date]. Someone noted the foreseen and secretly deliberate killing of hundreds of millions of people under various circumstances might be described as some as contingency plans for genocide and as violating the convention.

So it was worth making some effort to categorize these as "collateral genocide," although the phrase was never used. The public was led to believe that our plans, if they were to be described as genocide at all – hard to avoid if you knew the scale of the casualties – amounted to retaliatory genocide; that wouldn't have had a good ring to it either, but in fact it was not the case that the plans were premised on responding to a prior use by the Soviets or others of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, the plans expected to initiate nuclear war – which even on relatively limited levels, would have had consequences deserving the name genocide.

[Side B]. We would be planning to initiate these attacks, which could only be cause omniscidal, as escalation of a non-nuclear conflict, which would be at its largest incomparably lesser in scale.

My concern with this deliberate policy of massacre from the air goes back at least to a study done at RAND, later published into a book, by Fritz Sallagar, *The Road to Total War*, which revealed that in February 1942 the British switched to an air policy of night attacks on population centers in Germany as the main form of attack. He cites a declassified response to this directive, an attack plan against a city which as before specified objects of attacks as ports, military bases and railroad centers. The Air Secretary, reading this plan, feared directive might have been misunderstood or plan might lead those implementing it might make aiming of the bombing conform to these categories. Wrote in margin of plan, "Hope it is understood that the actual aiming points will be the built up portions of workers housing and not the categories mentioned." From that day on, bombing was always misdescribed to the British public and later the American public as intended to destroy war supporting military bases and that any civilians killed were an unfortunate but unavoidable side effect. Even internally the euphemism used was de-housing as if the target was the housing and not the people within them.

In effect, the category of military target had been secretly expanded to include the sleeping children of war workers or anyone else living in several miles of workers housing. The choice of workers housing not because they were so important but that they were built closer together than the houses of managers and owners in the suburbs and thus more subject to conflagration. The city was the target; the aiming points were the most densely populated parts of the city but this was lied about from the beginning to the end of the war.

The Americans, although initially emphasizing precision bombing, under the delusion that daytime bombing with the Norden bombsight, could actually destroy... criticized the British approach but had nothing to temper it; in the later months of the war, American bombers used the same approach, for example, participating in the second day wave of attacks by Dresden, after the city had been set afire the night before by the RAF. LeMay's approach in the Pacific by the night of March 9th and 10th, was to adopt the Dresden model as the exclusive approach, which prepared him for his later targeting of thermonuclear weapons on Russian cities. As he once said to the RAND physicist Sam Cohen, "father of the neutron bomb," "Sam," "war is killing people; when you kill enough people, the other side quits." Burning alive between 80-100,000 people, after successfully producing firestorm on 9th and 10th, LeMay proceeded to attempt to produce the same on next 67 cities, in order of population; atmospheric conditions were never just right to produce another firestorm, although city of Toyama was judged to be 99.5% destroyed, but the total civilian casualties between March and August 1945 prior to the use of the atom bombs is given in *The Fog of War*, in an interview with McNamara, as 800,000 dead.

The 300,000 killed in Nagasaki and Hiroshima over a six month period must be added to this plus about 600,000 civilians killed in Germany. [So almost 2 million?].

This 1.7 million deaths, is approximately the body count of Aushwitz. This is not to say that any of the officials, commanders or crews, actually liked doing this (though LeMay's descriptions of the unprecedented disaster he inflicted on Tokyo does have a prolonged bloodthirsty tone of triumph). But LeMay's "had to be done" attitude underlay that it was done deliberately, with foresight and intent.

And yet, the very first public announcement of Hiroshima, was a deliberate deception: "This morning, the U.S. Air Force, destroyed with one bomb, Hiroshima, a military target." It was not until days after that the public gradually became aware that Hiroshima was a town, not a military base and that the military factories and bases on its periphery were not the intended aiming points and in fact were little damaged.

That was in August of 1945. 60 years later, in the May-June issue of *Foreign Policy*, 2005, he describes realistically the scale of death in Nagasaki and then asks: "Why did so many civilians have to die? Because civilians, who made up nearly 100% of the victims of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, were co-located with Japanese military targets. The death, though not intended, was the inevitable choice of those targets."

Here we have the man, the official, who was Secretary of Defense for the longest period in postwar history (some 10 days longer than Donald Rumsfeld) – that must include Rumsfeld's both tours – lying about the objective in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 61 years after Truman's lie of August 1945. (In fact, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with two other towns, had been left off the targeting list for earlier attacks because of a desire to show maximum population deaths from these two bombs alone. They were picked, chosen for this function, in large part because their contribution to the military war effort was relatively negligible so there was no pressing need to include them in the 69 cities destroyed earlier).

It's striking that McNamara feels the need to continue this falsification – in the face of generations of declassified information contradicting it as to the intent of the bombing, in an article, in which he is more harshly critical of our nuclear policies than any other official has permitted himself to be in those 60 years. "I would characterize current U.S. nuclear policy as immoral, illegal, unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous." But his falsification of this 60 year old history is in line with his discussion of the dangers as coming from an unacceptably high risk of an accidental or an inadvertent nuclear launch. He does talk about the possibility that American Secretary of Defense or President could make a "misjudgment or miscalculation in times of crisis," and he gives more specifics about past instances of this possibility than any other former official of his rank.

So why not go one step further and admit the simple historical fact that our plans from Hiroshima on aimed at the killing of population? The targets, he says, were military "and industrial." "It is worth noting that during the Cold War the United States reportedly had dozens of nuclear warheads on Moscow alone because it had so many military targets and industrial capacity." For a Sec. Def. at the end of his life and out of office for almost 0 years, feels compelled to use the words reportedly, so as not to appear to be revealing classified knowledge. Second, the notion dozens is a deliberate falsification. Lynn Eden quotes a former commander in chief of the US strategic command: (presumably General Lee Butler): "who read a draft of her first chapter. He wanted to know why I put only one bomb on Washington for her calculations as to the effect of a one megaton explosion. He said, "We must have targeted Moscow with 400 weapons." P. 16.

My own memory of the move towards the Single Integrated Operation Plan in 1960 to '61 was that the first attempt to take account of all of the weapons targeted by the tactical air forces as well as those of the Strategic Air Command revealed something like 187 weapons on Moscow. This was in the days before missiles and multiple warheads. The reason explained to me by war planners was that every tactical unit with deliverable warheads wanted the honor and prestige, "for budget purposes as well," for placing at least one warhead on Moscow."

So here McNamara is describing something like 100 or 200 warheads as dozens and giving the reason that it contained so many military targets. He goes on to say, "Presumably, the Soviets did the same." "The notion that our weapons don't target civilians because our collateral damage would include tens of millions of civilians dead." On the one hand, he is admirably striking through the deception that populations are not targeted per se but again in 2005, in an article intended to be his strongest statement ever of his own or any other official of our reliance on nuclear weapons, his estimates of the numbers of innocent civilians dead are off by a factor of some 60 times as of his first year as Secretary of Defense and that is without including the effects of mass fires revealed by Lynn Eden or the possibility of nuclear winter first revealed in 1982-83 by Carl Sagan and colleagues.

In discussing the horror and folly of nuclear planning, he uses a figure of tens of millions of innocent civilian dead in place of what he knows (because I discussed it with him), a JCS estimate of 600 million dead, with a better estimate being several billion dead and the possibility of 6 billion). The several billion is a figure I can look up was done in the 80s by the National Academy of Sciences.

Tape 2, Side A

On December 12th, I was in Hamburg, first to be destroyed by a firestorm, in July of 1943. I rather quickly got on the point that I had held in my hand this piece of paper, which gave the number of people the JCS estimated we'd kill in the SU and China alone, 325 million, and rest of the world in the next six months alone, 600 million. I told them that I felt this was an evil plan, an evil document, that it should never have existed, because the reality it described should never have come into being. Not only had been brought into being by successive Presidents and same kind of Generals and Colonels that I worked with daily but that the JCS had unapologetically given this to the President without submitting their resignations or themselves for imprisonment for crimes against humanity. I supposed they didn't know the answer because I thought they had never calculated effects of their planned attack on human populations; no one outside would have suspected such a thing. Folks I worked with thought no such calculations existed because they wouldn't have wanted it known. That they were actually recommended going ahead with such plans.

I expected an answer, either that they didn't know...or that they would give an answer so low that it was obviously false and we could ridicule it and demand reconsideration. I deliberately limited my first question to casualties they expected in the USSR and China alone, so they wouldn't say give us a while to calculate Albania. I was wrong; they had done the calculations and quickly relayed them. So they knew. And yet in that summer of 1961 they were recommended that the President make threats

to initiate general nuclear war if Krushchev carry out threats in Vienna to give control of the access routes to Berlin to East Germans by the end of that year, assuming that the East German would block access routes and demand concessions over Berlin.

People might have assumed that President might contemplate such an attack in retaliation for an attack that killed 125 million Americans; but what was clear was that this was what they proposed to do as a consequence of a US first strike, arising over a conflict like Berlin, as had actually happened in 1948. In 1948, Truman ostentatiously sent B-29 bombers to Europe, for the first time since the war, in support of his threats that they would be risking a full scale nuclear attack if they limited our resupply-airlifts to Berlin.

Bluff by Truman because B-29's didn't include the apparatus for dropping the nuclear weapons. The warheads were left behind in civilian custody of the AEC. Wouldn't have taken long to transfer warheads to Germany if Truman had wished but wasn't contemplating doing that in matter of hours or days. Plan that existed then existed on myriad of bases in world, SAC bases and tactical bases, with perhaps some 3000 bombers in range of Russia and hundreds of missiles, ICBMs and Polaris missiles. The calculations was for an existing operation plan intending to be carried out within minutes or hours of a presidential order and had been rehearsed daily around the world. I had since pilots on a 10 minute...at the sound of a claxon, F-100s. They didn't actually taxi because the bombs not designed for carriage outside plane they were actually using; if they had run into each other, with 1.1 megaton bombs, 1 million times the largest bomb of world war II, or amount of bomb tonnage dropped in all of Europe by the US – each plane. All over the world, subs, aircraft carriers, one vast slingshot or mousetrap was poised to deliver a near simultaneous blow to every city in Russia and China with fallout that would hit over of Eastern Europe, etc., and depending on the wind, Western Europe too.

The Russian retaliation with MRBMS- would have accounted for 100 million casualties in Europe, mainly in Germany. These plans were meant to be executed in a rather wide variety of circumstances other than attack on US such as a conflict with US forces anywhere in the world, Iran, Cuba, where US forces would have encountered not 14,000 troops they expected by 40,000 with tactical nuclear weapons delegated to their commanders.

Two levels beyond 2 and _ billion not well understood then; to this day, effects of mass fires not been calculated into military effects, and whereas nuclear winter folks estimated 5% of attacks would results in firestorms; a more authoritative estimate estimated 100%. Firestorms occur as fires effected local windpatterns, occurred only in Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo, and possibly in Kassl and Darmstod. Hiroshima led to a firestorm; thermonuclear weapons basically guarantee this if set off near urban-industrial area. 2nd, as if in 1960 they were still neglecting fallout which was included in secret military calculations. In late 82 and mid-83, articles for the first calculations of effects of soot and dust from fires, almost surely underestimated by authors lack of awareness of ubiquity of mass fires, firestorms; certain threshold, perhaps 1000 urban areas to be hit, smoke and dust from simultaneous fires to blot out sunlight, freezing, epidemics, famines, destroying all vertebrate life on earth if going to the Western hemisphere.

A good calculations in 80s not including nuclear winter, by NAS, within 6 months or so considering loss of all hospital and medical facilities, deaths at 1 and a _ billion or

more and easily up to 2 or 3 billion, without considering nuclear winter, for northern hemisphere or perhaps whole earth, destroying all life on earth, contradicting Edward Teller and disciplines that couldn't kill more than a _ of the population which he said in my hearing at 1982.

Teller's estimates short of nuclear winter was not far off what I've been giving here.

Let me concentrate on lowest of figures, which rather neatly is 100 holocausts or _ a billion. Many people in the world at large have seen nuclear war as the end of life on earth. It appeared for a long time that these fears were exaggerated although in 1960 and 1961 they were not unrealistic. But elites in general, especially in the US and in Europe, while dismissing such apocalyptic and exaggerated concerns have remained strikingly ignorant of the actual nuclear dangers we live in and I apply that to even most arms controllers who aimed at reducing these risks. Still think they have lived far too easily with the failure of each one of their efforts to lower the danger. There have been partial successes but each of them turned out to be limited and not precursor for more far reaching changes. All of these people, including myself, however much our anguish, lived relatively comfortably with failure of our arms control efforts, as much as with the worst military failures in history.

The audience clearly agreed with me when I pointed out that until very recently it has been taboo to describe the scale and the impact of the bombing of Germany as if they had not deserved it. As LeMay put it for the Japanese, there were no innocent civilians because they could have overturned their government. Contributing to the war effort and couldn't complain given what soldiers had done to Chinese in Manchuria, etc. [Isn't that Osama's assertion]. For Osama, there are no innocent Christians and Jews. He points out the way the West conducts war as a legitimation for what he's doing in terms of retaliation, reprisal and deterrence.

The scale and meaning of the situation has been obscured for elites and the public and I'll talk now about the allied side, democracies as much as anybody has been, so public is implicated in this. What's obscured; scale of the damage contemplated, never ever officially released. I doubt if a single nuclear state has ever had a single official give an estimate of the number of people who would be killed by carrying out their warplans. Estimates are only given by people outside the system who can be described as lacking direct evidence and knowledge of precise targeting and are dismissed as advocates, hysterical, apocalyptic, so their calculations are dismissed by elites and the public.

Great internal underestimation or lack of curiosity about the actual scale, though as my example indicates, was more calculations than disclosed. Analogy to body counts though there are secret official estimates. Pointed out in last two weeks, Bush has come closer to giving body counts because of being unable to point to any other benefits. So first time in three years, are getting some estimates just in the last day or two of numbers killed.

Always underestimated. No advantage in revealing how many they propose to kill. Implications for own values, priorities, obedience to leadership, obscured by notion that civilian casualties not foreseen or desired, thus obscuring British bombing from 42, Americans from 44 and first two decades of nuclear planning, where almost nothing other than civilians were targeted. Not led to question quality of their leadership cause they are told leaders abhor non-combatant casualties which is opposite of the secret truth. For last

five months of the Pacific War, the American policy was to kill as many Japanese non-combatants as possible and that's what they did; also true of the RAF from early 1942 on. And though not the purpose of American bombing in first couple of years and came to be the purpose.

Killing of civilians never came to be seen in terms of the public declaration as avoided to the maximum; as military targets came to be the largest number of DGZs, most of those are on military targets and have been for forty years now. Not on cities per say since early 60s, but the destruction of civilians always been part of all of our war plans. Some special circumstances to minimize but not heart of war plans. Maximum population damage was always major option, most likely alternative to be used if surprise attack by the Russians. In short, although using our available nuclear forces to maximize population deaths has not been the only or ever prime objective of our forces for probably 40 years, since the mid-60s, it has been every year, from 45 to the present, the effect of our plans, because the multiple hitting of military targets, many ground bursts, has almost certainly come close to being the literal annihilation of adversaries and allies.

If President orders our forces to maximize the number of people killed, my very strong speculation, 100 to 1, almost imperceptible difference in our actual planning and probably not a measurable difference in the number killed, which would not increase. Could be wrong. Existing plans which probably haven't been designed for maximum population damage but probably have the same effect.

Let me go back to the notion invented by my jolly fat colleague Herman Kahn of the RAND corporation, perhaps the funniest stand up comedian I have ever heard in his secret briefings and author of thoroughly deplorable book on nuclear war, which our mutual friend Albert Wholstetter told him should be burned, after which they never spoke again.

Doomsday machine presented as idea should not ever be constructed. Idea was a system involving various destructive elements in communication systems which would automatically destroy all life on earth in the event of some triggering attack. Why might one imagine ever building such a machine. If objective was to do nothing other than to deter attack on the US, such a machine maximized possible damage to adversary and made it impossible for adversary to hope they could deter you from such an attack, because it would be automatic. Why imagine a device that would destroy the whole world than just adversary's country; I believe answer would that it would be much cheaper to destroy all life than to build a system limited in its effects to a particular part of the earth. He didn't by the way conjecture the phenomenon of nuclear winter which would have been the kind of global effect that he'd been postulating.

His point was that it was a mistake to focus only on deterrence, which would be satisfied by this device. But you had other objectives, that attack didn't occur when you didn't want, that there is human intervention. Another reason why didn't seem like good investment; wanted to be able to threaten first-strike against the USSR to deter variety of actions especially a conventional attack against Western Europe. Doomsday machine wouldn't do that unless you set it to be triggered by non-nuclear attack; it would be suicide pact which didn't look like the most credible deterrent to a Soviet non-nuclear attack. But it's too disproportionate and automatic. But he expected universal dismissal but some people, notably engineers, were attracted by it.

Given the reality of nuclear winter, what Herman did not know – because he was not clear to examine war plans, and because no one knew of the nuclear winter effect – our current warplans fulfilled his requirements for a doomsday machine, not only in global effects but in near automaticity; the constant rehearsal, reliability, training for unquestioning obedience to execute orders at all levels, and triggered by a wide range of actions to be deterred; a possibility that he also speculated about, called “Doomsday in a hurry.”

Let us grant that the Air Force didn't have in mind the nuclear winter effect. In 1960 and 1960, almost everybody understood that the Soviet Union has almost no missiles with which to respond to a US attack; 4 liquid fueled, which took eighteen hours and 182 bombers [less than 200]. So wouldn't have destroyed all of US. None would have landed in US. Fallout caused millions of deaths in cancers over time...in contrast to Europe and the neighboring areas.

The intelligence community greatly underestimated likelihood of destroying Germany; underestimated intermediate range missiles targeted on Germany and rest of Europe to the same extent overestimated ICBMs against the US of which there were essentially none until 1962. The Soviet Union had targeted so much of Germany that could have imagined driving down to the center of the earth; slight exaggeration but not much. From mid-50s on, NATO response to Soviet attack on Berlin or Germany would have led to the utter annihilation of Germany and other countries with fallout; the final solution of the German problem. And Soviets not shy about recognizing the German problem after the last two invasions. That's misleading because of course they brought on one invasion; but after WWI and II.

Whereas you needed hardly any counterforce against SU to protect US against retaliation, no way to make it unlikely that Germany was to be annihilated, because weapons targeted against Germany, many of them were mobile at unknown locations. Thus, Germany, with hardly any of its people knowing it, had signed onto a literal suicide pact in joining NATO and a pact that implicated them in mass murder in the highest degree as well as shared suicide. Told audience that in 1960 Congressional delegation from joint atomic energy agency discovered German owned starfire planes (notorious in Germany as death coffins because of accident rates) manned by German pilots on runways with American nuclear weapons aboard ready on 10 minute alert; nominally in control of American with 45 on hip with key around his neck which controlled still more warheads in bunkers on non-alert planes. So these would have gone into East Germany on NATO command which might or might not have come to the President since the President had delegated authority to use them under various circumstances. Germany was in effect then and today a nuclear power. Khrushchev knew and complained about it and was source of his pressures on Berlin. But American and German people as a whole did not know this.

So Germany in particular has not only given its assent to its multi-genocidal first strike attacks for the past 60 years, for the last half century while it has been.... It has been a participant as well as major potential victim of these planned attacks. At various points in this period complaints have arisen from German officers about these plans, but always with euphemism and underestimation of possible damage, like McNamara's statements in 2005. Great scandal arose in mid-50s in Germany about US exercises for tactical nuclear weapons, that might involve more than a million German casualties; may

have gone as high as millions or even up to ten million. Caused great controversy but not in the ballpark of what the actual casualties in the late 50s. All fission weapons then. Are all two-stage thermonuclear weapons, fission-fission now.

A major aspect of the ignorance of the actual situation we're in 1) never understood damage contemplated in early 1940s and 1950s but 2) never absorbed the difference it made to switch from atomic to thermonuclear weapons, came in late 50s in deployment and planning with first operation testing the Bravo explosion in 1954 which hurt the fisher in Lucky Dragon – 15 megatons – 15 million tons, somewhat more than 1000 Hiroshima's; gave rise to anti-nuclear movement in Japan. Were a mainstay of weapons into early 60s, but not as big now because they're more accurate.

When in Pentagon, Kennedy saw unloaded a very large weapon and asked what it's yield was and told 20 megatons; 20 kilotons was Nagasaki. AF told story of rolling of eyes since Kennedy said, what do we need those for; at time, was standard weapon. Not in large numbers but dozens to hundreds.

The Titan warhead that flew off the warhead from accidental fuel explosion in Kansas was 9 megatons, our largest missile warhead. Would have released more explosive energy than all of the bombs and shells in human history. All of that in one warhead. Krushchev exploded the first two stages of 100 megaton weapon, to match Kennedy over Berlin and counter his threats; AS warned him that might break all windows in Moscow.

If it takes, according to Sagan, 1000, 100 kiloton weapons on urban areas to cause nuclear winters, and may be great overestimate if mass fires are included, then only US able to do that in 1961; Soviets could have done it by 1968. And no other country has matched that since, though if warhead testing is resumed, France will MIRV it's missiles and so will be able to produce a nuclear winter and other countries could join that shortly if they chose too by increasing the number of missiles, China and England for example.

Only two countries that have a nuclear winter capability. Searches for metaphors cause so outside of human experience. What existed non Doomsday machine; so far as JCS knew, was not; US and most of Southern Hemisphere would have been spared. What would have been annihilated, SU, China, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and all the countries near the Sino-Soviet bloc. As a threat, would have looked far more likely cause could have been threatened without the US.... LeMay, Eastern Establishment could accept 20 to 30 million dead rather than to see them as part of the economy of the USSR. So at the least, a Eurasian Doomsday machine; as USSR acquired from last 62 on acquiring missiles and subs by mid-60s and 68, Northern Hemispheric doomsday machine in which US would be joined to the casualties. In reality, in back of this, global doomsday machine, assuming that cities were targeted as absolutely were then and almost surely are now.

Note one final thing; although purpose of planning was to keep the peace and deter war; recognized by anyone close to system multiple chances of false alarm, accident and unauthorized action that could trigger this off. And leaders realized there were occasions that best course of action was to execute these plans. So an operation machine had been built up and constantly exercised that US leaders knew would kill half a billion people.

Been going up this very long route to come to something very hard for an American or member of the Western alliance to say; let me put it like Joe Gerson says in

his book, *Empire and Nuclear Weapons*, the manuscript of which I've been reading for the last few days. When I say they've contemplated, threatened, rehearsed and accepted in their minds in most cases, that they would under various circumstances carried out these plans. If they have specifically contemplated failing to carry out the plans under the circumstances that the plans have specified.

So far as I am aware, there is no piece of paper known to me that has ever suggested in writing the possibility that these plans – the general nuclear war plans – would not be carried out for the circumstances for which they're unmistakably postulated, such as overrunning of Berlin or Soviet attack on West Germany. McNamara has said it was his belief that US should never initiate nuclear war. That of course contradicts everything he said repeatedly secretly and publicly to NATO allied throughout his seven years in office. But I believe that that was his conviction, that he was lying to NATO allies and can accept his belief that Johnson and Kennedy shared his belief.

I believe that this was McNamara's conviction and that he almost was surely right about Kennedy and Johnson. Neither was confronted by recommendation from military that he would do this in hours and days. And though Johnson showed great desire not be forced into this on Khe Sahn, if it was overrun, I think he could have been persuaded to use a nuclear weapon. No President since Truman was ever confronted by that; Truman since 1950 when trapped at Chosin Reservoir, but if been cut off, would have been confronted recommendation to use them. Closest was Tet in 68 but considered by Westmoreland but doesn't come close.

McNamara said would have to use nuclear weapons if China came in and I'm not sure his assertions apply to China.

McNamara's clear advice to him would be to give up Berlin rather than use nuclear weapons. On this occasion I think he's probably telling the truth.

I believe there exist no memcon and said it to me in 61; no such thing as limited nuclear war; end of everything as far as Europe was concerned. Never saw a situation which I said a benefit to the US to use nuclear weapons first. For him to say that is unique.

Another noteworthy thing he said; On Oct. 27, ready to launch invasion on 48 hours, would have been met with nuclear weapons; not slightest doubt in his mind that we would have responded with an all-out attack against the Soviet Union. Question: would that be against his recommendation. Commander of Chief in Air Force said if we invaded Cuba, Soviets would do nothing.

The realistic likelihood that they would have done nothing would have been as close to zero as you could get.

Szilard, who had started the arms race with letter in 39, flew with wife to Switzerland so as to be part of negotiations after the war; Szilard, knew problem of fallout, as much as in denial as human could have. Wiped out from fallout from Germany and Austria. Would have been safe in the US, but didn't know that K. claims of parity were bluff.

What Kennedy was facing, was not the likelihood that the US would be destroyed. When McNamara feared he would not see another Saturday sunset, not

because US would have been destroyed, but because he knew there was a real chance that Washington DC or New York would have been destroyed in Cuba. My memory is we counted 38 missiles in Cuba which Acheson and JCS wanted to destroy in surprise attack and counted 43 coming out so five or so we didn't know were there. Had knowledge of unauthorized action. I, naively, was feeling quite confident that K. had to back down because I knew how outgunned he was in strategic terms, I believed wrongly he would have thorough control of his own forces.

It's odd that I would suppose that, unlike McNamara, which was a real possibility, given that I had just spent four years learning how possible it was for an American to launch nuclear weapons with or without delegation. Accepted delegation that Russians were much more careful.

The CIA specifically didn't believe they sent warheads for the FROG missiles because they had never sent warheads for these weapons in Egypt.

Think 14 IRBMs and 28 MRBMs, 14-15 IRBMs and a lot of Frog missiles. I think 60 warheads they had ashore. Never dreamed K. delegated to FROG folks; came out in 1992 but some controversy because some claimed K rescinded order at the height of the crisis. Had to assume that having been given earlier delegation, some would have disobeyed orders and fire the missiles.

I thought changes of nuclear attack were small; underestimated willingness to gamble with catastrophe to order immediate defeat. CMC affected my understanding in 64 and Vietnam showed me how wrong I was and Gulf War. Most people didn't think we were going to war. Everybody I knew said one side would back down. I thought there was 60-70% chance there would be war because neither would back down. Nobody was looking at that involving cataclysm except chance that Sadaam would be killed and missiles with chemicals being sent on Tel Aviv if he died. Probably would have shortened the moratorium on launching nuclear weapons by 17 years now.

In terms of prediction, of what's possible in the world, in way of deliberate slaughter by statesmen, in industrialized countries – let's put aside Rwanda or the Congo – what it's possible for a statesmen to contemplate or carry out, the first big warning was World War I. The first day of the battle of the Somme, the British and French launched five waves against German machine guns and barbed wire, lost 58,000 casualties, including 19,000 dead; the attack continued, didn't change generals, tactics; no effort to end the war by negotiations; ended 2 bloody years to go; Pacchendale, again in 1916; when war ended with 13 million dead, mostly military, under statesman not one of which fit the model of totalitarian statesmen which emerged from World War I, and some of them model for liberal-democratic leaders. As Leonard Wolf put it, at beginning of his book *Flanders Field*, war demonstrated the moral limitations of the world's leadership. That was a warning to how we were lead and what it might lead to in a world of war, empire, and technology. To say the least, that didn't prevent WWII.

One effect of that on the allies was a determination by many in the Air Force and civilian officials, that one must never again fight a war on ground with casualties limited to military, as prescribed by Aquinas and Augustine 900 years earlier and enshired in the law of war right up to Geneva conventions. The core of international laws of war, *jus in bello*, was secretly abandoned, by the civililian and military leaderships of Britain and the

US, though this was not acknowledged until now. They've gone on LeMay principal, that war was to be fought primarily on attacks on industrial resources.

Meanwhile, national leaders have arisen who were not focused on this particular principle, neither Germany, nor Russia, nor China, nor for that matter France, developed significant strategic bombing capability – but who demonstrated a ruthlessness with little precedent up till then, who demonstrated ruthlessness against own civilian population, which was like ruthlessness in Civil War and WWI like to own ground troops and enemies. 11 million civilians by Germans and more than 20 million each, Stalin and Mao and Japanese killed about 20 to 30 million in China in WWII.

This defined for us their characteristic as men of evil for which any means necessary was justified to thwart their domination. Thus, US strategic bombing in US and UK was scarcely at all was the subject of controversy to the extent it was known. Exceptions to that from some voices but was ignored. [check on Bishop of the Church of England]. Earliest US nuclear warplans simply extended LeMay's tactics against Japan to all of Russia and China with atom bombs and calculations of top secret war plans were remarkably low, measured in millions and then ten or 15 million by the late 1950s. I say low because I'm looking in context of knowing calculations in early 60s with the difference coming from substituting H-bombs for A-bombs. Still within area of 60 million dead in all of WWII. Suddenly leaped to ten times that many from US attacks alone with hardly anybody knowing because of the secrecy of the war plans.

Eisenhower had given instructions to folks, AEC commissioners, that they should not mention that difference and avoid use of the term fallout so people who were killed were lied to and never warned as to what was killing them prior to the atmospheric testing and thereafter. How many of say 500 to 1500 know the difference between an A and a H bomb, one to three, one to three who say one is larger the H bomb, but they don't know how much larger, which is by a factor of 1000.

Circling around, showing how hard it is to get myself to the following point. Not a question of deterring the Stalin from attacking the US; at most, responding to deterring an invasion of Western Europe, of greatest consequence by earlier historical standards. But our response goes beyond all earlier historical experience. Russian troops had never crossed the line into Western Europe in history but Germans had gone in the other direction a couple of times. But what was planned beyond that something very far beyond previous experience in human history.

Joint Chiefs, who in 61 virtually ruled out possibility of surprise attack, even before they admitted the Soviets didn't have such a capability; most likely way was escalation of existing conflict. Eisenhower had plans that any conflict with Soviet forces anywhere in the world, as general war. Super secret, JCS forbade in writing to Sec. Def, who at that time was not in the chain of command, before 58. Was to be shown general war plans but not to be shown what general war was. A control skirmish in the Berlin corner was not armed conflict cause that might not be with awareness of higher ups. Two brigades, yes, two divisions yet. 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany. Anything beyond a couple of battalions. Eisenhower could have not carried out that plan but made sure there was only that one plan. Didn't want the army to have a basis for fighting Soviet forces for limited action, cause you otherwise couldn't refuse their request and there were supposedly 175 Soviet divisions. Knew this wasn't true but was official estimates for NATO purposes. This would cause inflation, depression and a war economy.

Definition changed by me.

Berlin crisis in 1961. Major fear of US response to US blockade of Cuba was Soviet reaction in Berlin. Soviets said that was unlikely. By that time, 1962, we had some other plans as a result of me, Bill Kaufman, McNamara, etc. When Kennedy said he was ready to risk general nuclear war if necessary, he was talking about our plans. Let me guess he didn't mean to do that.... I think he would have rather have given up Berlin. But there was another occasion the JCS said in 61 of Soviets backing into West Germany. Supposing there was an uprising in East Germany like in 53; GDR forces built up, as close to being Soviet forces; 22 divisions in East Germany of Russians to keep GDR in line; suppose some divisions of East Germany decided with insurgents. Would have been then forced to retreat by Soviets; fighting retreat into West Germany.

So Soviet troops pursuing East German forces into West Germany; plans called for all out attack and hard to provide any substitute. West German forces could have entered into this and the US with its some 500,000 troops. Could you be sure that none of these forces fired tactical nuclear weapons. And if that started, do you stop exchange short of general nuclear war. Came within a hair's breadth in 62. According to Sovs, fear that they would blockade Berlin unfounded, but his desire to defend Cuba and Russian troops there farther than Russian troops or we knew. And that would have led to all out nuclear war.

The purpose of our nuclear weapons and foreign policy to preserve and protect our imperial sphere, including all of the former colonial possessions of allies and adversaries, British, French, Germans, Japanese [and Belgians, Portuguese, Dutch], replacing French control in South Vietnam with ours, to add South Vietnam to the American empire. The war in Cuba, without the fear that this would be the starting point of WWII; the point was to demonstrate a hierarchy of blackmail, where our superiority could put nuclear missiles on the border of our adversary in Turkey and they could not in Cuba. That brought us within a hair's breadth of carrying out our warplans. Without the nuclear weapons, even at great expense, next to impossible to maintain that empire, on borders of Russia and the Middle East, to keep the Russians out of Iran and to imagine holding onto South Vietnam without threat of nuclear weapons to keep our North Vietnamese or Chinese offensive. We could have held onto Cuba without nuclear weapons, but subject to the Soviets on Berlin.

One major benefit of US first-use posture was than it enabled us to hold onto West Berlin as a Western outpost deep inside East German territory; done by threatening to blow up Eurasia. If a Berlin Crisis had arisen after 68 in Berlin where there was parity. Whereas it appeared mad to the rest of the world since it seemed like global suicide, the US wasn't risking global suicide until the late 1960s.

Side B.

What US discovered in 49 when Soviets exploded our monopoly, we could have most of the benefits of monopoly from superiority, if that vastly outweighed their ability to retaliate; could threaten them or their allies – through first-use in far flung empire. We could hang onto Berlin and keep them from extending umbrella over Cuba, and hang onto empire in the Middle East. So question Kissinger asked, "What in the name of God

is strategic superiority?" Was an answer to that in the late 60s. He was asking that in the 70s and answer was much more tenuous and first strike would have been suicidal. For practical purposes that's still true now, whatever the *Foreign Affairs* article says, deterrent power of a few weapons; no way to be sure we won't lose a few major metropolitan areas.

How do you sum this up? A secret of US foreign policy is that it has been consciously imperial since at least the middle of WWII, for over 60 years, and global in scope. Most of that has been what the British called informal or indirect empire, free trade – unequal terms of trade – but empire that is not maintained by direct occupation and administration but by local elites who are maintained in large part covertly by money and violence, their use of torture and massacre against insurgents, assassination; unequal exchange comes into being through local elites brought into power by imperial power. So implicated, as much, in torture, etc., not necessarily more nor less; what's knew, an extent, possible only with continuous threat of nuclear weapons to back up allied or interventionary forces if necessary against adversaries. Just as British had navy, gunboats, better artillery, our secret weapon has been nuclear, pretty much concealed, unaware of 30 or more instances where the US has actually used nuclear weapons, by policies dependent on being willing to use them, threats, etc. Empire invisible and the means are invisible. And the means are evil.

We have been defending Berlin and West Germany by holding hostage every human being in Eurasia and eventually the Northern Hemisphere, and possibly most of that time, the world. Since 1968 it has been a global doomsday machine set for detonation over Soviet occupation of Berlin or by Soviet penetration of the NATO frontier and capable of being set off elsewhere, in Iran, elsewhere in the Middle East, etc. Plans secretly determined that they will be executed rather than accepted the loss of one or another imperial possession or attack on our forces. If these plans are not evil, what is. Terrorists are regarded as despicable or evil because they hold non-combatants hostage and kill them. But we have been holding hostage the entire world.

In his introduction, Joe Gerson underlines an almost unprecedented aspect of his discussion; he talks of naming an inconvenient truth; that US nuclear weapons and war policies are evil. What else is one to conclude when successive US governments have threatened omnicide to preserve the prestige, careers, and profits of a few. Of course, probably no official has conceived of policy in terms of those motives, though a close examination of the policies shows that is an accurate description in virtually every case. They thought of protecting Western Europe and Western civilization. When one looks at alternative means rejected; it is hard for anyone else to deny that these motives of protecting careers, power, prestige, profits, an establishment, party, are dominant in their minds.

And for them to think of acting in the interests more broadly than that – civilization – by planning to destroy the world in order to save it looks like self-interested denial. Perhaps it's obvious to agree with Gerson, though said this ten days ago, and use the word evil, however much that words has been tainted in projected on supposed aims and values of our adversaries. There are some other words are likewise tainted by promiscuous use, or selective use that serve bloody minded and chauvanist purposes yet which nevertheless seem indispensable in understanding us and the moral urgency of

moral and practical change. These words include evil, empire, evil empire, terrorism, fascism, torture, tyranny, aggression, nuclear blackmail, murderous, mad or crazy, out of control, lying and deceiving, genocidal.

Whenever used, they usually involve projection and a distinction between us and them but what they describe does not require that; does not require an Other, not part of their necessary definition or application. The reality is that they do define us and our imperial policies as well as they apply to other empires, democratic or authoritarian. Go along with physical capability and psychological and political readiness of our leaders and most of the informed public, media, legislators, courts to inflict, under various very possible contingencies, destruction of other human beings on a scale that was not remotely achievable by any other regime in human history, however ruthless or tyrannical.

We are used to seeing Hitler and for all but the extreme left, Stalin and Mao as the apotheosis of evil in terms of ruthlessness, Hitler above all. It's true that Hitler's industrialized extermination of a particular group on a scale of 6 million (plus 5 million non-Jews) is unique but on reflection it seems to me quite wrong to imagine either Stalin or Mao would have shrunk from a project if they thought it suited their needs.

The category of evil person has never seemed to me essential as opposed to the category of evil doing, which does seem to me to be indispensable, if it is understood to be available and demonstrated in leaderships that do not appear to have the personal power lust amounting to psychosis of Hitler, Stalin, or Mao.

What I have come to hear, obviously, is a recognition on my own part, that this degree of ruthlessness, in terms of constructing, preparing and threatening a doomsday machine, far beyond a physical capability of those leaders or any other. I believe it is misleading to see that readiness in different moral or even predictive terms from the ruthlessness and recklessness of those totalitarian leaders.

Once more to quote Gerson, he is saying that the foundations of our foreign policy – rooted as it is in a willingness to threaten or execute nuclear plans – is evil at its core.

And I should say it's central to my own thinking that plans like these have not been produced by men or leaders who are evil in any sense of extraordinary or even unusual in their human characteristics and the performance of their roles in society. We have here a problem of a human species organized as it has been for the last several thousand years, and very newly armed with a technology that threatens possibly all life on earth and, more likely and far short of that, hundreds of millions to billions of people.

Househauser poem: I'd said at the beginning of my talk in Hamburg that I regarded these plans and their revelation as an evil plan, as an evil reality. And I said at the beginning of my talk was that I had not done what I could to change such plans by bringing them to the attention of the wider public at the time I had them. I regret that I had not then done what I did do ten years later, giving them to the press. I then came to a poem I found one or two other people knew and thought was commonly known in Germany but none of the others had heard of before. It was a poem found on the body of a man named Albrich Househauser who had been a German academic, geographer, and part of the foreign ministry, but who had been always antinazi and had joined the efforts

to overthrow Hitler, an effort that remains controversial to this day. There was an effort to bring about an official pardon to pardon....for his attempt to assassinate Hitler. Always a concern that this would be implicitly a critique of those who had not disobeyed their orders.

2/3rds of Americans said in 1971 in a Roper poll, that confronted order Calley was given to exterminate 500 to 1000 people, they would have done what he did though they deplored the orders; felt he was justified – one of the most popular things Nixon ever did was to weaken his sentence to house arrest. Then asked if the German generals should have been tried for obeying orders to commit aggressive war or war crimes, so the majority said no. Germans would find it hard to give that answer in a poll and Americans would find it horrific. Orders not exculpatory, even if the orders are killing babies. & when Ron Ridenhauer asked how he could have done that – killed them individually – asked friend who had been scout and model soldier and his up till then friend and mentor, oh it was just one of them things and went to sleep. Whereupon Ridenhauer... I got the first RR award a few years ago.

Point I was newly making, very unusual for an American official that his oath to the Constitution ought to supercede his oath to secrecy; secrecy not a sacred oath taken... Secrecy oaths are contractual agreements. Oaths taken by all civilian and military orders. And when the President is manifestly flouting the Constitution and is now again clear under Bush, then to be silent about that is to be totally complicit in that violation of the law and the Constitution. Mere fact of lying won't necessarily inhibit or breaking the law if it gives President the benefit of the doubt. So Democrats-generation believed ok to violate Constitution with our submarine activities, clear we were lied into a war in considerable part, in circumstances. But hardly anyone think that it was a necessary thing to do. So put the burden of proof on those who said it was wrong to lie.

One should take account of what the lies were about. Zinn points to the war crime; dropped perhaps first napalm in European theater on German soldiers and French civilians. Emphasizes the lies, unjust means to the point to denying that it constitutes a just war. That is a very interesting question. Just war requires just war and just means. Seen very little when just cause does imply enormously unjust means or whether there is something comes unjust means in an unjust war; came to see that even our killing of...

I said in Germany – 200 – what they were not used to hearing, my age or older. Never heard anyone say, describe the bombing of Hamburg and Dresden as horrendous in their effects, something only recently discussed lest they seemed to be complaining... You can use unjust means in a just cause and fight against Hitler was a just cause, but unjust means even if a strong case that it would be necessary to win. And there was a strong case that it wasn't necessary; in fact, German war production went up in 41, 42, 43, 44. Other uses for massive resources put into the bombing; I think the British lost some 30,000 crews. Close to as many lost in combat in Vietnam; if effort that did literally nothing to shorten the war. Could have been used instead in close air support, against communications and so forth; almost certainly did not shorten it by a day; by any view, massive war crime.

Claim that it was justified because it was necessary false, as it was soon known to be, and the same is pretty much true of Japan; war in Japan went on for five months after most massive terror bombing in history; Okinawa was after that. Japanese far more

influenced by other considerations than deaths of civilian compatriots. I said if you were to list the crimes of the Nazi regime, and I wonder how many would put on that list would think to include the London blitz or the bombing of Coventry or Rotterdam. Think there's a reason; because it wasn't prosecuted at Nuremberg.

Of course they were guilty; weren't prosecutors very decently didn't prosecute for what allies had done since they weren't prosecuting the allies for it. Didn't want to prosecute that because didn't want to define it as a war crime because we wanted to do it in the future, which we did five years later in North Korea; Rosie O'Donnel, head of PACAF said that. Godfather of the Marx brothers; not a structure was left standing. He had been in charge of the bombing of Korea.

War crime, Japanese did it in Shanghai and Chungking, and Germans did it first in Warsaw, Coventry and London; but for ton of bombs Germans dropped, Britain dropped ten tons, Us and Germany killed 600,000, 20 times as many to German's 30,000.

We did it; must have been ok; nobody was prosecuted; it's the way war is to be fought. The common law of war had to be regarded as changed practice because of the war. As Jackson said. Early a-bombs killed just as many.... Then the plans go on, killing 100 and 200 times more while hardly noticing. Attitudes as to the acceptability of nuclear war sealed in with first-use threats of NATO in '51 and '52 which it's important to recognize is before the thermonuclear era. Americans think of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as having won the war, told it had averted a million deaths. To be celebrated, saving lives. Seen as peculiarly effective in winning a just cause; to be celebrated; that's the way to be seen by most Americans. About half now (increasingly young people think not).

Their concept of nuclear war is formed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki; destruction of an order we surpassed in Tokyo and Germany. Horrible deaths by fire indistinguishable agony folks in firestorms and by high-explosives, 1.7 million; none of them died.... Only difference is that it didn't happen all at once; not obviously better as a way to die. Actually the heats tend to be different except in the firestorm. 2-3000 degrees celsius. Difference is you're looking at the effect of dropping the trigger, the detonating cap, to a modern nuclear weapon, the Nagasaki bomb that sets off an H-bomb. People have never seen that used on a city- an a bomb takes a whole out of a small city, 50-60L%; large bomb, H-bomb takes out a metropolitan area, let alone, number of H-bombs, mass fires simultaneously.

All we have are H-bombs, some of them smaller than Hiroshima; average one, them larger, 5 to 10 times more, or 29 than Hiroshima; we have 10,000 and Russians have 10,000 plus 1,000 more with the other nuclear nations.

Gerson: nw and wp, evil. Wrote today: those of us who had anything to do with war plans including the possibility of escalation to nuclear war, like people at RAND, or most people in the Pentagon, all of us, including those who are most critical and I am one of those and not the only one, extremely critical and of escalating to nuclear, never less than when I first heard of Hiroshima at 14 and never changed that attitude. Speaking of myself and others like that like HR, MH, Albert Wholstetter. Thinking about a generation of people who were involved in arms control work and met very many of those: "nothing that we have done - who have had anything to do with nuclear war policies, even in opposition, still less of what we have not done, relieves us of the burden

of having participated knowingly of evil, often under the guise of having participated in lesser evil. So far, we Americans, except for 64,000 and their relatives, the 58,000 killed in Vietnam, 3000 in WTC and 3000 in Iraq and hundreds of thousands injured, somehow, we have gotten away with it. None has gone to jail; I was the only one who came close, which I prophesized to Ralph Staven in 71. In the end I'll be the only one who goes to jail. He pooh-poohed that as self-pitying. A month later when I was indicted, he panicked and destroyed all the copies I gave to him.

None has been ostracized. True, for Vietnam, Walt Rostow had to go to Texas, and Dean Rusk went South; but none has lost careers beyond what's normal other than a change of administrations for these policies. Other than that, nuclear war preps, our evil doing is not much less though not much more than other empires, torture, assassination, oppression, famine, depression, etc.; our clients, and we do it generally through proxies, our imperial policies are not really worse than those of other empires, though the secret is they are not any better. But it's a little saying like Hitler, other than that; when pictures shown at Nuremberg, Nazi war criminals extremely glum. As Goering said, before that, quite pleased with testimony they are putting out. [Sumer-PP]. In that respect we're abnormal because we had the capability.

In the Civil War, Sherman set a model for total war by destroying the infrastructure from Atlanta to the sea to the limits of their capabilities. WWI, destructive as they could be, given their limits, including air attacks on London and Berlin. In WWII, ironically the Germans, having initiated terror bombings, didn't rely on it very much after 41 and 42, though did use V2s, the British and US killed as many people as they possibly could, and capabilities weren't so limited. Our plans in the atomic age always been based on killing as many people as they could in Russia and China. And with the advent of the H-bomb, a quarter of the earth's population, but more likely half to all. As all the advisors to the GAC, it is an evil thing in its own right, in any light; Fermi, Oppenheimer; a weapon of genocide. Not one of them shared this insight with their fellow citizens. Saw it could be avoided by a mutual ban. Overruled in their recommendations and thereafter went to work on the program. Oppie dropped his opposition at the critical point, moving his main efforts air defense and tactical nuclear weapons. Teller accused him of discouraging people to work on it; failed to encourage them.

Now I come to my German poem, H is imprisoned, mid-44 in connection with coup against Hitler; retreats to cabin in mountains, in hopes they wouldn't go after him because role was tangential. On 23, April 1945, he was let out of prison because all the evidence of their involvement destroyed in an air raid. So they let him out; SS men met him at the prison, took them to a field and shot them in the head, two weeks before the fall of Berlin. His brother found them in this field inside his coat, clutching some 79 sonnets. Frozen body, clutching these sonnets, poets, dramatists and sonnets. Say it in German. A year earlier, Annegret Falter, said pronunciation too bad.

Dan reads in German. "I bear lightly that which the court calls my guilt. Would have been a criminal had I not planned for the future of my nation. But I am guilty, but not in the way you think.

Should have called evil, evil; I should more sharply, evil, evil have named. Kept my judgments. In my own heart I condemned myself, betrayed conscience. Knew early

on, warned, not hard enough, nor clear. Today I know what I was guilty of." I know what debt I owed.

Yet I am guilty but not the way you think. Whatever bad happens to me I earned it, not only on July 4, 1946. I have guilt as beneficiary of death, survivor in clinical sense. If I were to look as Househauser did at moment of his death; if I look at what I was involved in 58-62, 61-63, my work on escalation of the war, 64-65, in Vietnam, 65-67, and I look at the limits in what I did in the way of limits of whistleblowing from 75 on, then I'm not inclined to single myself out but to include myself in all of the people I knew, though in some cases I had special knowledge that went beyond theirs; behaved like SS and RG at our best. In connection with the nuclear threat, if you look at arms control community as a whole, clearly a failure and very clearly inadequate; doesn't measure up at what is called for, absolute limit of our social and ...capabilities. Some come close to it, like the Berrigans. Activity short of their effectiveness.

They did subject themselves to long prison terms, as did of course vannunu.

Side b, of tape 4.

Stopping atmospheric testing worthwhile for health effects. Eventually, 30 years later, 1992, getting underground tests stops. Did my best on that; got that stopped and that was worthwhile. Prevented the vast expansion of the anti-ballistic missile systems on both sides; would have been very dangerous had Cold War continued, Reagan takes credit for that playing some role in ending Cold War and that may be true. For the moment, getting multi-warhead missiles, largest, out of action, and pershing and cruise in Europe; all these did reduce danger of false alarm, and instability of posture.

But the test ban is in great danger.

Ending of the Cold War. Clinton's lack of action except for success in getting weapons out of Ukraine, Khazakstan [and Belarus] and slowed up the North Korean nuclear program [due to Carter really]. Eisenhower people most culpable of all. Kennedy and Johnson's failure to reverse. [Don't think Acheson wanted to go over the line, in Berlin]. [Acheson wanted to get Norstad out of Sacuer, with Acheson, Wholstetter and idea]. What we were working on was we didn't trust Norstad to escalate to nuclear war.] [Went to DC to help AW staff Acheson out of NATO]. [Kaplan unreliable on Kennedy and McNamara]. [PALS, great concern under Kennedy]. [Feaver's books]. [Marv Stern central to it]. [So no consideration that K. would do in Cuba what we had done in].

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[Lynn: Doesn't include alternative hypotheses; asserts that we bought too many nuclear weapons because we underestimated the effects of damage from fire, or didn't calculate it. But perhaps not. Perhaps she's just assuming the war plans. But why doesn't she say this].

What's going to happen in Iraq. Sistani has just gone far to confirm my guess as to what Bush's current strategy will be by opposing it; come out against splitting Scii against Madhi army of Sadr; continues with original strategy that Shia must stay together as a block, constituting as they do, 60% of the population. So opposes demonizing Sadr or condemning their position...

The US attraction to S, according to Dreyfus, are only folks along with Kurds who want to US to stay; and offering themselves to do what Maliki doesn't want to do and that's to disarm the Sadr militia. Sadr been more active gunning down Sunni and Shia. Getting security back in Baghdad thought by remnants of neocons to securing Bhagdad and thus the rest of the country. Iraq, domino effect, democratization of ME, proven not only unattainable but idiotic....

Sistani's intervention work against Bush's catastrophic move of a Shia-Shia war, with US allying with Badr. If Sistani does manage to keep Shia groups together in assembly, implies legitimating Sadr's demand that US leave; would give the US better than a fig leaf, by agreeing to demands of Parliament and also the American people. Whether Sistani could get unified Shia to deal fairly with Sunni is another matter, and that's where Iran and Syria could contribute. Sistani also opposes surge of 20,000 or as reported as of today, 50,000 troops. Jack Kenne talks about 18 months, so it's not just a surge but a new increment.

This would be actually in a direction of a reasonable way out and favorable settlement but believes Bush is opposed and will listen to General, including on in charge, Casey in Central Command leaving soon, open but dubious, but Abizaid against it like the Joint Chiefs, especially in absence of clear cut mission. They worry probably precisely that specific mission is in line and that's attacking Sadr militia and Shia alliance with S, which they see as catastrophic.

Bush shows no interest in Baker's rec. of direct talks with Iran or Syria on any subject; according to R. Parry, he and Olmert and Blair may have been conferring directly about attack and regime change on Syria and perhaps Iran, with idea it may solve problems in Iraq. He's supposed to decide in about 10 days, by early next year. Will be very happy if my prediction is unfulfilled and I can say I was wrong. Think he will increase forces, going against most of military, but with support of 1 or 2 active retired generals. Will be used to split of S. and Sadr's militia; will be burgeoning strife with US and Shia and Sunni in which their demand is US to leave...prediction, in matter of months, Sadr militia not weaker than present 60,000 but much stronger because of recruiting. Real possibility of war with Syria and Iran.

According to S. Blumental and others, Bush's whole stance is to dig in further and resist change, comparing himself to Churchill, 50 and H. Truman in closing days of Cold War; feels Truman in Korea strongly indicated....

The Democrats...and good luck on their willingness to get out.

Nuclear: I do approach this subject from the peculiar subject of few Americans to think about the emergence of a nuclear weapon a year before it occurred in 1944, concluding almost inevitably an instrument of power 1000 times more powerful than any weapon in action that could only to do harm to the world, would make the world a more dangerous place. So I start with a background shared only by a few people in the MP, who spent very little time thinking about the long-run implications until the bomb was virtually in

hand, 6 months after I was assigned to think about it in junior high and they came to much the same conclusion as insiders. That the feasibility of these weapons confronted humanity of brand new challenge, controlling if not totally imprisoning, containing, rejecting, eliminating new technology in a way that would keep it from destroying the future of humanity.

No previous species had acted in such a way as to have a clear risk of leading to its own extinction and no previous species...did in fact contribute in any significant way to its own extinction. Human, building on certain proclivities in its ancestors, notably the chimpanzees, acted in an aggressive way without parallel to other species...germs of anti-human hostilities and rivalries that could have wiped out the species. For a variety of limitations, including limitations on the technology of warfare, no human activities came close to having the potential of ending human life on earth, although we have been a destroyer of many other species in a variety of ways.

Going back to 1939, when Leo Szilard first rented some uranium and demonstrated that when uranium 235 split...they released more than one free neutron, thus allowing for the possibility of a chain reaction. Set off Geiger counter with thought, man headed for great deal of grief...Indeed, think this possibility contradicts the theological notion of all powerful god who is compassionate to all humanity. Nothing else in nature seems to require this characteristic in uranium; but that combined with our abilities, thumbs, walking erect, proclivity to group bonding that regard each other as rivals and enemies and targets for warfare, the existence of uranium 235 and its byproduct plutonium 239 was the equivalent of a kind father – supposing one existed – leaving a loaded 45 on a dresser in a household of 8 year old boys.

This was a test of our “free will” which we were certain to fail. So at that moment, in 39, along with patenting idea of chain reaction, Szilard should have turned his attention immediately, rather than waiting 6 years, to preventing this from being used in warfare instead of exclusive question, if it will be used, be used by US rather than the Germans. The latter question not unrealistic, immoral but to focus exclusively on it when far from certain Germans would do it – in actual fact they did not – was, let us say, regrettable, if not irresponsible.

Why was no thought given among the MP physicists as to what the appropriate policy would be in Germans didn't have the bomb and US was going to win the war without needed the ab. British known by 44 and the US by late 44 cause of reluctance to accept earlier evidence. J. Rodblatt reacted appropriately in stopping his work in producing the bomb since didn't need it to counter Germans. They blackmailed him by threats of false accusation of espionage and deportation into agreeing to leave quietly as to why he was doing it or lack of a German program.

Even so leaving the program not the only responsibility of person with esoteric knowledge. No later than at this point was it necessary to do what one could to prevent the bomb from being used, since one compelling rationale for possessing it just found to be a delusion. For most of the physicists and officials dealing with it, there were other much less compelling rationales that were more than sufficient for moving ahead with crash program and dropping the bomb on Japan. But for audience fully informed, none of those rationales might seem sufficient. So possibility of disrupting momentum towards use of bomb, by revealing to public what it would mean, consequences of its use, and what its alternatives were. Szilard did make a unique effort to bring the attention to

FDR and Truman, who passed him onto Byrnes who had no interest since he had 3 or 4 other secret reasons for using it. Szilard then failed to take steps to bring this the attention the public at large, a failure he later condemned himself for in short story, "My Trial as a War Criminal," prosecutor keeping protest in channels, bound to fail.

E. Rabinowich, rapp. of Franck report, wrestled but finally concluded it wasn't worth the personal risk in that public would agree with use of the bomb. Didn't feel his going to prison for life, I infer, simply to have the American public to have the opportunity for testing its own values and making the wrong decision.

The opportunity to stop the process for informing the public raised again decision for the Hbomb, now the US has lost its monopoly of atomic weapons, was it worth for political reasons restoring a clear cut superiority for some years by increasing its destructive power by 1000, an advantage sure to be temporary, but superiority could be achieved by having more and better missiles than the Soviets.

The scientists of the GAC almost unanimously decided that advantage not worth effort, it was essentially weapon of genocide, evil thing in its own right, and rose possibility of extinguishing all life on earth; raised with atomic bomb in 42 because likely to lead to H-bomb. Most scientists were tested at that point on human proclivities that made this whole chain of developments so dangerous. Confronted in very first meeting, theoretical ... of abomb, that very test might lead to immediate extinction of all life with ignition of nitrogen of the atmosphere. They did postpone work till had refined calculations; but never able to eliminate the real possibility of atmospheric ignition would end life, either in the region of the test, Nevada, or the earth as a whole. But thought that odds were sufficiently low so as to justify the experiment. Didn't change standards for calculating the necessity of the bomb or the urgency of the threat.

Premise: Germany might produce bomb and necessary to counter them. Discovery that might lead to end of life on earth might have led them to reopen question of how likely it would have been that Germans might get a bomb – 0 – and whether there wasn't some other way to deal with this, if it did exist, as opposed to setting it off themselves.

They went ahead with a test where a number of the top scientists weren't convinced at moment of the blast that they were not about to experience the end of all life on earth. Anecdote on Conant on that; and Fermi. This is the performance of scientists confronted with this possibility at beginning. Later calculations: no possibility so illusion. Question arose again later with Hydrogen bomb.

What they were left with prospect of bomb possessed by more than one country; all scientists believed Soviets would have abomb in few years and Hb a few years after US, so likelihood of explosion increased or hard to eliminate, to reduce to zero. Couldn't eliminate risk by eliminating US which was true till 49.

Scientists faced moment they feared in 42 finally arrived. Crash program had finally arrived; arrived when satisfactory design for the bomb emerged in 51. We are now on the verge of producing the actual machine which in sufficient numbers can destroy all life on earth. Rather than address in addition to any others, how do we control this; how do we keep it from being used by anybody, which did preoccupy a lot of the scientists after 45; hardly arose; but study 52, just prior to first test, under Lilienthal and Oppenheimer proposed forgoing and perhaps postponing any test and thus avoiding the

emergence of the Hbomb on the earth since it demanded frequent test, much more than abombs.

Proposal was made; rejected and scientists were convinced, Oppenheimer, Lillienthal and Mc.Bundy not to reveal to public what was at stake and what alternatives were. Might have gone ahead with public knowledge but possibility of protecting humanity from the existence of these devices. Several similar points where new developments, if explained to public and Congress, might have led to very different program that US and USSR executives developed in secret; ICBM in late 50s, exploit H-bomb; the discovery in late 61 that supposed Soviet program to lead in ICBM's as illusory as Sadaam's in 2002; strategic world different from all of our analysis and possibility for negotiation and mutual ban different and more positive than nearly anyone believed. Nobody was really made aware of this though. Noone, including me, who could have done it, informed the public of the new intelligence and implications of it.

US using its nuclear weapons, repeatedly, in every case secret from the public, by making plans and threats to use nuclear weapons in a crisis situation. Abomb replaced in planning by Hbombs, with significance known only to few inside the government and none outside. Now a real doomsday machine.

The intended result of destroying all life in Eurasia would have been achieved and destruction of all vertebrate life in the world a real possibility – the late 50s. That situation has never changed and only became known to public 30 years later in 80s and still has not resulted in any change in the machine.

As if discovery Trojan Horse on beaches of troy contained Greek soldiers had no effect on the Trojans plan (after 7 years of war) had no effect on their plans to move the horse within the city walls. Interesting parallel: prediction, precisely, made by patron goddess, Cassandra, daughter of Priam, gift of foresight, curse, that no one would believe her and think her mad. Predicted the fall of Troy and the dangers of the Horse and the .

Reminds me of R. Jeffers poem Cassandra. "Mad girl....This screaming voice and screaming hair. Does it matter if no one believes your bitten fountain. Truly, men hate the truth...new lies on the old, and our praised for kindly wisdom. Poor bitch be wise." Warning about the move towards WW II. Certainly had the feeling over 50 years, prophesize disaster and simply not to be believed. Key aspect in failure to believe this starts with extreme unwillingness to believe leaders could have been so irresponsible to have such destructive machinery for the purposes I say they have or any reason at all, especially in the absence of documents, despite revelations about previous leadership and madness and irresponsibility and unwillingness to contemplate this possibly of mass murder on absolutely unprecedented scale, and specifically the extinction of our own species.

Definite fact that none of these warnings have had a definite date or certainty the fact that they have not occurred in the 60 years does lead people to deprecate imminence of them or short term possibility. Helen Caldicott tried to motivate people by repeatedly warning them that if we didn't change things drastically in the next two to four years than we were doomed. Not clear she was wrong in the sense of long run opportunities we missed. So, people think if wasn't imminent so perhaps it wasn't real possibility. Can list seven or eight things matters of warning of myself and others that have not happened.

Specifically, starting with, there's been no all out nuclear war, positing the possibility of nw; no limited nuclear war, either unilateral or two sided; no deliberate use

of now on humans at all in 60 years since Nagasaki; no accidental nuclear explosion (although high explosive explosions in dropped nuclear warheads have scattered radioactivity). 5) nuclear powers have allowed themselves to be stalemated or defeated without turning to nuclear weapons; US in Korea, Vietnam, Soviets in Afghanistan; the US so far in the Iraq War. All these are very good and it is true that I would have predicted by this time. There were times when I thought it was quite likely, more than once, and have said so, and it hasn't happened. So that's evidence that I and others have exaggerated danger. No unauthorized action.

Proliferation: Despite selective encouragement of proliferation by the US, has been held down to nine countries and only four new ones since 1964, rather than expansion to 30 or 40 predicted possibly or likely to this time by JFK or others in the early 60s. And finally, none of the intense confrontations that have been described as nuclear crisis led by the CMC has actually led to a nuclear explosion. This is a different history than anti-nuclear critics have been heard as predicting, and it is different from what I myself would have expected by this time and did predict in most of that period, certainly up till the ending of the Cold War, regarded it as extremely unlikely get to 06 without these disasters.

What should we learn about the likelihood of another 60 years without the comparable absence of disasters (including for example, proliferation to no more than 5 or 10 new countries)? I am prepared to conclude from this record that I have to some degree underestimated the inhibitions and obstacles to the onset of nuclear war and therefore overestimated its likelihood in the short run. But by how much? When I look closely at the history underlying the bare facts I describe, I find the information now available very much less reassuring than it appears to most observers.

I see a history of near misses, mostly still secret. I see cases unknown to me at the time where the world came closer to nuclear explosions than was known to almost anyone or still known to almost anyone. The failure of any of more than thirty nuclear threats to end with a nuclear explosion has many explanations for different cases, not all of them reassuring. In some cases the threats were bluffs, but in others they were secretly successful. The ending of the Cold War was certainly a major tectonic change in dangers that neither than I nor anyone else known to me foresaw. But at the same time new dangers have emerged since then and the old ones have not been eliminated.

Going back to the earliest fears in 42 and 49 of the implications of Hbombs for humanity. Was it after all, overdrawn, to see the need for eliminating this threat as the overriding task of survival for the human species?

I don't think so. Even today, the avoidance of nuclear winter that could destroy life on earth depends, among other things, on the ability of a failure of an accident prone warning system to produce a sufficient false alarm in the next hour to trigger the doomsday machine. False alarms just below this critical threshold have actually occurred frequently and a more compelling one is no less likely than a hurricane of unprecedented force hitting the gulf coast. There is a clear cut package of policies that could drastically reduce the dangers both of nuclear winter, all out nuclear war, and limited nuclear war, drastically and quickly, widely known with wide support and yet US policy moves in the opposite direction from nearly every one of these policies.

The dangers that people are urged to think about such as nuclear possession by terrorist groups and covert proliferation and diversion of loose nukes from Russia, or

traffic from states like North Korea and Pakistan are indeed serious current dangers. But given current likelihoods of occurrence, none of these come close to frequent threats of the US as the number 1 threat to world security. The frequency of US nuclear threats as in threats against Iraq and Iran, preclude any willingness by the US to change its policies encouraging proliferation and any effective effort by US or anyone else to delegitimize possession of nuclear weapons by others.

Perhaps I should say along with actual examples of threat-use by the US, the US-Russian forces on high alert and the very possession by each of them of arsenals that threaten nuclear winter are at the top of the scale of threats to world security along with the poorly guarded nuclear materials in Russia and the inadequately monitored activities of Pakistan and North Korea.

The nuclear first-use policies by the US and other nuclear weapons states such as Israel and Pakistan encourage use and possession by others and prevent all these nuclear weapon states and their allies – as in NATO, Sweden, Japan or Australia – from working effectively to end proliferation and use and to prevent there from being an effective movement to end nuclear weapons. Hard to see an effective movement without these countries – the US in particular – much less against them. Of course there are other policies by the US and others which threaten world security, for example, USG government opposition on global warming, US policies against the use of condoms against aids and population increase; US policies on Pakistan, in particular; and now on Iraq, Iran and the ME.

Still, I regard the US reliance on weapons of mass murder – as WMD's have been aptly described by President Bush – is what above all defines the US as a nuclear rogue state, the evil empire.

Notice that all of these dangers that I described are incomparably greater than the supposed dangers on which the administration had urged the public to focus in the last 6 years, namely Iraq WMD's and Iranian nuclear weapons, both unreal dangers lied about by the administration. On the list of current dangers threatening the world, the possible possession by Iran in 5 to 10 years of nuclear weapons is a real one, but one that does not compare in urgency to a US attack on Iran or its consequences.

As Tom points out, given the secret inclinations and plans of US and Russia, it is something like a miracle that we have gotten through 60 years, rather than a reassurance. It's reassuring to discover that miracles are possible just as the actual dissolution of Russia and the Cold War and ending of the apartheid regime in South Africa without violence. But to rely on them; it's not an assurance that a comparable that we'll have another miraculous deliverance.

There's two ways to draw from the lack of explosions, one is that the analysis leading to fear was wrong. Many people with no knowledge find it easy to go with that, vs. doomsaying Cassandras; that our affairs in the hands of careful people, making likelihood very small, thus not making it miraculous not gone off. Disproven by knowledge of inside decisionmaking.

The CMC is a very powerful case in point. Some people object to the term miracle at all, as religious, as Dawkins argues. If you mean as event never be understood that's an offensive thought to scientists. But in terms of events occurring that can't predict, that happens all the time.... Certainly in political science, can't predict half of what occurred.

[Discussion here].

Looking at arms control anti-proliferation and mutual disarmament, given present US policies and to a lesser extent policies of other nuclear weapons states and near-nw states, given those policies, is as hopeless as gun control in the US or control of global warming, and for similar reasons. One theme is guns aren't bad, it's bad people using them for bad ends, or as Shane said, guns are just a tool maam, all depends on who uses it and Ahmadinigrad says that.

We've got a world shattering risk here considerably more intractable given current US policies than let's say gay marriage and comparable to gun control. Supreme leader AK, disagrees with A, said in fatwa, that nuclear weapons are unislmalic and non to be possessed and used at all. No comparable Judeo-Christain asserted, not Christian, or Hebrew. When the news that the first explosion of nuclear weapon success, code word message, Bhudda smiles. Number 1 exemplar on human nonviolence in history, Gandhi.

What can be done, what must be changed, what must we change in our own behavior; first focus, change these present US policies. Given these intractabilities, what can be done without or in the face of US opposition. Delegitimate nw or first-use?

Could there be such a movement by some nuclear weapon states or allies, such as in NATO? NATO did make a move towards changing its own relation to first-use in 98 and 99, a commitment by reds and greens, but backed away when they could not get US agreement. How can UK justify money for Trident and their first-use policy?

The Labour Party aside from Blair can't possibly put out a valid argument. If Iran can have an anti-Holocaust symposium; could some states hold conference that's anti-nuclear, anti-intervention? Could this happen in LA, Venezuela, China? When after all would Russia, increasingly reliant on nuclear weapons, use them? They abandoned their no first-use policy. Groups like Middle Powers initiative or Canberra forum; but power not great. Takes almost a nuclear state capable of renouncing their own nuclear weapons.

If Mandela would have been the one to drop them he'd be perfect but it was De Klerek. One would have like to think Mandela would have dropped it. Britain, Germany, Sweden (closer and closer to NATO); I suggested they stop all military collaboration with US should they attack Iran. Accepting hostility of US policy in way that JF and ? didn't want to do in 98 in face of A, C.

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What would McNamara have refused to do? Thanks for his candor that if they faced nukes at the beach....he's said what they would have done; would they have gone along with this? In favor of changing NATO so no reliance on first-use but can't do that on Berlin. [Start taping]. Arose in Summer of 61; doing Berlin planning. I had been working with DA and AW on importance of removing Norstad because not to be trusted not to use nuclear weapons early. Was helping AW to write memos to Acheson give to the President. Acheson said he'd given this long memo to Kennedy, maybe one AW and I worked on. W said did he read it; Acheson said read it in my presence; he reads very quickly. AW-I've heard some say he actually reads to quickly. DA-not sure how much he understands. There are times when I'm ready to say to him "allright, you run the country."

Acheson writes his report; more disposed to rely on the threat but had the impression, like AW, MHoag, MH, etc., were dead set against carrying out the threat under any circumstances including NATO and McNamara too. Emphasis on building up NATO, now ready to recognize smaller than projected; Alain Enthoven did a lot of work on that, top secret memos, PEMA paradox. P, stood for petroleum. Had to do with logistical side of military forces; when we look at own forces, we assume you need so much of this and that for a division, but when we look at the Soviet forces, we make estimates of their requirements enormously less than their force size is; so either underestimating what they need or we are wrong about their forces. Bob Komer worked on this a lot too; was McGeorge Bundy's assistant; of work for CIA before he went to WH, that 175 divisions very misleading; didn't focus on fact that Russian divisions roughly half the size of ours or NATO's.

Moreover, lots of evidence that lots of those were paper divisions, exceptions were Soviet divisions in East Germany. Lacked whole units; didn't have as many battallions; as many as 40 paper divisions for mobilization, headquarter staff that you could staff out if there were mobilization. NATO had more men under arms than the Warsaw Pact, known in 64 when I was working on this.

Even stronger operational forces/divisions, NATO was very comparable; not two to one, but you don't need that. One of the first sentences for top secret NATO Council meeting that I wrote in 63 when I went to Paris; one of my lines was, the notion of a David with a nuclear sling confronting a conventionally armed Goliath is totally misleading. So then I discover in Sept. after Berlin game in which Ed Whays, White House Counsel, have to give up Berlin. Then discover Russians have no ICBMs at end of month; K said to Kennedy at Vienna; glad to see you recognized reality that there's parity; my generals say we're superior and Kennedy did not argue with that. We had 10 to 1 in nuclear terms over them. Saying he's turning out missiles like sausages; not wrong about mrbms and irbms. First reaction was how to leak it into the Kremlin and wrote draft speeches for Kennedy to give to K at summit; coordinates of 4 missiles. 2nd, wrote a speech, initially for President and used it; gave it to TS who gave it to Gilpatric and accepted more or less word for word, including statement, our ability to strike back after best conducted Soviet first strike greater than their ability to strike in a first strike.

Theme, we will not be deterred from doing what we must in Berlin by fear that the Soviets would respond in a nuclear attack; that would be self-destruction. K had since 1958 threatening nuclear war if we try to move through to Berlin; quoted him in Lowell lectures in 59 that he made to Harriman; if you send tanks they will burn and if more tanks, our missiles would fly. Didn't know if they were bluffs but clear by 61 they were. We can send divisions in without fear they would initiate nuclear war. K. sent missiles to Cuba to achieve degree of parity; wasn't good effect. I would have sworn that I had never in my life made a first use threat. Many years later was looking back and how did I miss the point that this was, after all, a nuclear threat?

Thinking of tanks. If they get surrounded. I think G too 5,000 crack tanks Dec. 7, 1986, described by Pentagon official as worse than Pearl Harbor; probably had 10 to 20,000. They would quickly be surrounded. I didn't ever face that consciously. Balance is such that he's got to back down. But that was relying on our first strike capability. Example of double think, two contradictory notions in your mind, which ever bureaucrat has. I had idea I'm against first-strike and first-use threats but wrote a famous speech

was first-use and first-strike threat and led K. to his decisions on Cuba. When I thought of that decades later, more evidence that anyone including me, fooled into you could support just about anything, rationalize anything.

McNamara says he's against first-use but he made the threats, more than he recognizes, for example, McGeorge Bundy reacted angrily to my statements all Presidents used nuclear weapons in memory of BBrodie that all Presidents did this. MB; can say that's untrue for President's I'd worked for. I said you may be right about private views but in terms of what they told generals, public, adversaries, they did. In book, one year later, CMC did not involve nuclear threats by the US, to initiate nuclear war. Not a nuclear crisis; didn't believe K would initiate nuclear war and we wouldn't; had conventional advantage, same the Soviets did in Berlin. Believe he was sincere and manage to keep from thinking about fact that Kennedy was almost obsessed with the thought that if he even blockaded Cuba that Khrushchev would blockade Berlin and would hit missiles in Turkey. Doesn't seem like necessarily involve nuclear war but difficult to do and Berlin is another matter; we were deterring that with nothing much other than threat of nuclear first use. Think McGeorge Bundy never thought of that as a contradiction. Just like I managed not to think ahead where would that lead. My point here being; I'm led to the conjecture about McGeorge Bundy just by analogy with myself.

Took Berlin very seriously. What if division being overrun. Possibility not zero that people would go against him if he wanted to back down. Not ordinary insubordination. Drummed into them, for President to decide. If President determined not to do it, probably it would not happen, but not certain. He was in about that much trouble in the end by not invading; believe there was a mood of conscious consideration of coup, because been led to believe invasion was an option, and possible preferential one and seemed like best opportunity they might be given.

This group of generals, largely inherited by Eisenhower, but Kennedy appointed LeMay to shore up image of toughness. Believed we should annihilate SU and we wouldn't get our hair mussed. In Dr. Strangelove, says, I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed. There's was no question that Air Force just at accepting the ... victory after Khrushchev said they were taking the missiles out. Kennedy says no, no, we'll wait and see. Khrushchev promised ground inspection but Castro forbade it and we didn't get it. For years Keating said there was testimony missiles were there still in Cuba; couldn't prove the negative that it wasn't true; not unlike believing Sadaam destroyed all his chemical weapons. So the idea of hitting them anyway not at all not to be considered.

These Joint Chiefs, after decade of New Look, had sunk into moral depravity without noticing it; their willingness to gamble the world and kill hundreds of millions of people and lose hundreds of millions West Europeans and lose millions in the US like rabid mad dogs, insane, psychotic. These were the JSC Kennedy appointed and/or kept in.

Just by not attacking he was risking assassination or coup; not high risk but not zero risk. And I didn't understand it, how could they get so fixed on it in a crisis; but I realized this when I read Hershberg for which total readiness how now appeared. They saw it as perfect rationale.

On Friday, October 27, Harry Rowen and I, writing as fast as we could, possible attack on Turkish missiles, and how we would respond. We included a possible response

almost no one else would have included, to do nothing. We would have hit Soviet missiles and they hit our missiles in Turkey, the least they could do in a way, rather than let it escalate, cause any other thing higher risk of moving forward, attack base from which attack came, all Soviet air defenses in that region, set of bases in that region. Do your best to keep the conflict limited to non-nuclear weapons in the area. Think hard about not getting started on that route is what do they do then. Knowing the overall balance, I think I and Harry felt fairly confident that they would break it off cause just too self-destructive to go very far and that therefore they would back down.

My own tendency not to threaten a thing but now can't claim confidence at that. We thought other people wouldn't even think of this and if they did, never have the bureaucratic guts to recommend this on paper. Unique premise, we had just attacked Soviet missiles, unprecedented act, calling for a perhaps unprecedented response, namely nothing. Think own thinking, he's got to back down.

Chomsky and nearly everyone is wrong quoting Kennedy, as Sorenson reports, or Schlesinger or Bobby Kennedy; Kennedy to Bobby in presence of writer; one in three and even, paraphrased, as will end in nuclear war, or we would initiate nuclear war. Chomsky paraphrases this, putting one-third to one-half in quotes. If you're doing these things, Chomsky says, a moment of madness and lunacy unequalled in human history. Would be hard to question that.

Other people use the quote the same way. The actual quote, the odds were somewhere between one and three and even that the SU would take this crisis up to the level of nuclear war. But given my strong belief with evidence as to what Kennedy had in mind, looks different. Don't think that Kennedy thought there was a one-third chance given what he was doing, though there was, the possibilities and probabilities, but he and McNamara didn't know that. I think he's saying, I think there's a third to a chance half even, that Russians will confront us with choice; either make a major concession or go to nuclear war. How did that different. I believe – didn't at the time – strong evidence that if it got to that point, he would concede; he would not either invade or attack the missiles. So what would he do; we know he had prepared diplomatically, telling no one but Rusk, alert Saturday, Oct. 27, tell U Tant, to alert intermediary to tell U Tant to propose trade of Turkish missiles that we would accept.

We do know that Bobby Kennedy was telling Krushchev through Dobrynin our missiles would be gone in three months on assumption that he would not express that there was a trade; otherwise the deal with off; proposed a secret trade which is what happened. Krushchev made through Dobrynin about bringing it up; saying there are things we would disclose too in that case and deal was off. Kennedy didn't expect that offer of a trade to be adequate but he did come up with it. Publicly the promise not to invade Cuba never made formal and not binding because Krushchev never allowed for ground inspection of removal of missiles; had to see them on top of Soviet ships as they left. Never thought of that promise as amounting to much because we didn't know that Kennedy had in mind invading Cuba; that did give him something, if you could rely on Kennedy which was not a lot of rely on. But not gotten recognition of our parity; to put missiles on the border of adversaries territory.

That was what the crisis was about; ending was victory for Kennedy and humiliating defeat for Krushchev and firing a year later; but had prepared Rusk to do unthinkable the next day; if they didn't take his supposed final offer in view of

ultimatum of attacking in 48 hours, then he was going to do the unthinkable and taken missiles out of Turkey. Would be people in NATO who would go out of their minds; Turks certainly dead set against it.

Castro didn't ask for the missiles; was Khrushchev's idea. Question was, was defending Cuba part of Khrushchev's motivation. We didn't believe it in Pentagon; thought it was all totally rhetoric. I didn't know about Mongoose, despite having worked for EL who was in charge of it. I accepted until late that Kennedy brothers had licked their wounds and given up the idea.

If you are to look back at early accounts, surprised of one that had idea of protecting Cuba, even though that's what Khrushchev said. Now we know better, so remaining historical question, was that the overriding motive, or equal or less than equaling balance and demonstrating diplomatic parity. I tend to believe that was his main thought when I read memoir, which took a long time for me to believe is real. They're going to take Cuba away from me; I can defend it with nuclear threats. How were we going to protect South Vietnam from a North Vietnamese offensive; in 50s, with nuclear weapons.

George Ball said on Wednesday, "What if we traded the missiles in Turkey," in Gerson manuscript, didn't leak though might have been source of Lippman column on Thursday morning suggesting that. Gerson doesn't mention what I've come across, McNamara as early as previous week, discovered on Sunday, analyzed on Monday and discussed Tuesday morning by ExComm on 17th. 17th, McNamara; no change in military situation, as does Maxwell Taylor, but comes out that day or next with blockade, clearly doesn't solve problem of missiles that are already there but making other people furious including Acheson. No later than Wednesday morning, Kennedy is saying to Bobby, your job is to bring ExComm around to McNamara's proposal on blockade. Shifted discussion from Nitze, who say ok.

By Wednesday, Kennedy is saying blockade. Wednesday afternoon, Kennedy is not present; McNamara says not going to end without a trade. Going to have to give up missiles in Turkey. Saying the unthinkable; this is where phrase doves and hawks enters our lingo, in Bartlett's article which killed Adlai Stevenson, brought it into vocabulary.

Stevenson then came on Friday maybe from UN; big meeting at White House on Saturday to supposedly decide; think ExComm would get hawks to agree on blockade versus airstrike; bring Dillon, Acheson and JCS, not officially members, 'cept the chairman. But everybody knew blockade wasn't going to be the end of it. They first said they'll fire on any ships that try to stop us. Choose not too. Observe the blockade. Stevenson made proposal, giving away base on Guantanamo and Turkish missiles. Kennedy always described as having dismissed those; instead he said not now, i.e., not before we'd run the blockade, act of war, degree of risk taking. Rusk then says other fellow just blinked.

Kennedy was clearly determined to show that much aggressiveness and ... before he made any deals. Stevenson was ruined by Bartlett article – close buddy of Kennedy's – revealed even proposed Guantanamo and Turkish missiles. Bartlett hadn't been told that Dean Rusk had endorsed that idea earlier in the day and McNamara talking about the Turkish trade for few days. Much evidence that he was willing to consider a Turkish deal.

McGeorge Bundy and others stood up for the Eastern Establishment; catastrophic effects on NATO. My belief – changed various times – as Dobrynin says, it's almost surely true that Bobby Kennedy had suggested that deal to him on Thursday night before Saturday night meeting and that's why the Russians came up with it later. But Lippman having said it and others bringing it up, came up with it on Saturday after Bobby brought it up on Thursday; McNamara had been saying for more than a week that this was the way; he was actively opposing the attack. Trade was better.

One reason it took Bartlett article to come out; first Saturday meeting, united front, not discuss other options, any talk of Guantanamo and Turkish missiles; done till Bartlett. Read his telephone calls with Ball, who said thought President leaks. Not easy to answer why he is destroyed, if it was not for not bowing out of the race in 1960.

Kennedy's intention from early on, just like McNamara's; if no alternative but war, give him turkish missiles and therefore there won't be war. If I can't bluff him out of it to scare him and probably won't, hard to imagine he's backing down. Why back down; why not just sit tight? Kennedy: there's a hell of a lot at stake here, including being in the White House. SAC on huge alert. Could've had an accident at Boston Airport. If he don't we do. When he said one-third to one-half, and what is chance be a nuclear war; I suspect he believed zero if not close to zero. I'm not going to start any war. I thought he was prepared to invade or attack that night or Sunday; didn't entertain idea at the time that he would back off. Rusk revealed in '82 given this mission if Krushchev doesn't accept this ultimatum. Think he believed chance of war was virtually zero. Well, nuclear war. Russian ships might fire on ours.

He's not the lunatic who's taking the one-third chance of nuclear war, but you know most of it, if not all. Knowing what we know now; if you were given that picture, here's where we were Saturday afternoon or evening, October 27, 1962, what's the chance there will be a war. Anyone who put that chance at less than 1/3rd would not be paying attention; at least 1/3rd if not much higher.

Why didn't Krushchev tell him there were operational nuclear missiles in Cuba that would have met US forces?

Not sure Krushchev didn't know we didn't know. He could have revealed that he's got 40,000 troops on the island; why wait 40 years for that to come out, and delegation. Kennedy may well have said, take back that delegation. Answer could be, we can't be sure how much we have them under that control. And yet, in whole situation, Krushchev imitating Berlin and NATO strategy. Using Schelling strategy; put yourself on a course which might be out of your control and that's how you make the threats credible. Believe that Kennedy had a mistaken belief that he had more control than he did.

December 25, 2006, Tape 3

To tell him that he delegated, furious.... Would have known that even if he rescinded that didn't eliminate the danger. He could have just said he sent warhead for the FROG missiles; that would have been thunderbolt because CIA said they sent them all around the world and they had never allowed nuclear warheads to accompany them. Couldn't be sure that somebody wouldn't fire those if they were under attack. Nobody

dreamed such a possibility; wasn't in the discussion. Knew there was an uncertainty about the MRBM's.

Definitely, but those things may be fired without authorization.

He was reluctant to acknowledge and did not that he didn't have control over Castro's anti-aircraft forces. Khrushchev had begged Castro not to fire on our planes but Castro just says he's going to do it, and did so, starting according to Gerson, on the 27th. So Khrushchev didn't control anti-aircraft. Key aspect of the ultimatum; most crucial of keys to understanding Khrushchev backing down and no one else put in discussion at all; Bobby put it in memoirs in ambiguous way, but Bobby said to me, two threats; if he didn't take the missiles out in 48 hours, we would take them out (I think this was a bluff and making every effort to make that look plausible); if he shot down one more plane after the U-2, take out all anti-aircraft, SAMs, missiles, and surely go on to an invasion, but we'll do that right away. I even said something, so there were two separate threats here and he said yes. He alludes to it in thirteen days but you have to see other parts of the puzzle to no how significant that was. In the face of that, they probably assumed that there would be no further shootdowns, but they wrongly assumed they had control of anti-aircraft which they didn't, and even missiles. K knew he had not ordered U-2 to be shut down...assumed that he had ordered it. 2nd, assumed he controlled Castro's anti-aircraft.

All day Saturday to let them know I didn't shoot U2 down. You should know I can't keep Castro from firing that anti-aircraft. Everybody assumed that they could stop them. Assumed that they went to bed that night assuming nothing would be shot down in next 24 because K could control it; didn't let them know. Encouraged ultimatum that Bobby wouldn't have made, if D. had told him.

Khrushchev gets message 9:30 in morning, 9:30 at night our time; in about 9 or 10 hours daylight in Cuba; didn't know Kennedy had cut off U-2s, but Kennedy was going to fly low-fly planes; promised that to Joint Chiefs, and promised if another plane shot down, shoot down SAMs and anti-aircraft. Khrushchev knew in morning planes are going to get shot at; had wounded two planes the afternoon before. So nothing to do to get missiles out in nighttime, so we can tell them in morning the missiles are they way out. Key element was Khrushchev's knowledge that they weren't going to sit tight for another shootdown which he couldn't keep from happening.

The chance of war could have been made close to zero with Khrushchev winning; they were a number of things he could have revealed, or slowed down reaction by a few days so more missiles became operational, so no chance of attack or invasion under McNamara or Kennedy but pretty much under any President; he could have installed a Berlin on our border. The warheads are there, can't control anti-aircraft, didn't control SAM; had explicitly told Kennedy, talked about accident; the missiles are totally under the control of Soviets, and I think he also said that about the SAMs, but a SAM had just fired a missile at a U-2 without order; latest word, when Cubans firing on low flying planes, Russian was under impression that orders had changed and started firing. Own authority not believing it will be disobedient.

At height of crisis, SAC U-2 weather plan wandered into Soviet airspace – could have been deliberate move by power – always some son-of-a-bitch that doesn't get the word; familiar line in Navy and the Marine Corps. When John Paul Jones says, "there's

always some son of a bitch who hasn't got the word," "we've been fighting for quite a while."

Meanwhile, Gerson gives the story that the Navy was practicing anti-submarine warfare and forcing them up with depth charges. Been established that ExComm people, Kennedy and others, didn't know the Navy was doing that; but as of 2002, according to Gerson, those subs were armed with nuclear torpedos. One could ask what the hell is a Russian sub armed with a nuclear tipped torpedo, every diesel sub. One of these subs, oxygen running out, bombarded by depth charges, three commanders had to agree to fire; two of three in favor of doing it, go down like men and we'll blow up destroyer, Arkipoff, one of three refused to give their assent. If navy ship had gone up with nuclear explosion, game is on. Very possibly happening without knowledge of top people in Navy. Argument McNamara having with Anderson McNamara noticing that destroyer far away from the blockade line; noted that they were practicing anti-submarine operations. McNamara said that contradicted the signalling what of blockade. Anderson: if you go back to offices, the Navy will get on its blockade. Made him Ambassador to Portugal. Navy running blockades since the time of John Paul Jones.

They were attacking ships that were carrying nuclear weapons. Harry Rowen told me that his boss, Paul Nitze, thought during the crisis that there was a 10% chance of nuclear war and I was low man in the group. I was 31, never been in a war. 10% and we were doing these things (didn't know we were dropping depth charges), but subs had nuclear warheads. What were they doing with nuclear torpedos. If fighting a nuclear war, what does it matter what submarines are doing out there....

To use a nuclear torpedo on surface ship without...on board....

My outrage at Soviets were that they were being as reckless as we had been; been under the impression that the Soviets had been more careful.

10% and I knew we were blockading and doing anti-submarine operations, because Harry and I thought there were 1 in 1000 and that was stupid of us. My concern that I was working for people who were ready to take a 10% chance of nuclear war was justified; this was a type of insanity. 50%-that would be even more. I then learn Kennedy wasn't insane in that way; didn't think 30% chance and doubt he thought there was a 10% chance. Rusk and Kennedy knew, I, Kennedy, am not going to go to war; secret bottom line so chance of war small, but some terrible thing may happen; may be some unauthorized action of some sort. But given other orders put him on a course where he would have found himself, attacking, invading, and invading Russia. So chance wasn't 10%, 1/3rd; it was higher than that. So what do you call it; if you're going to blame them. Kennedy overestimated his own ability to control the situation. Assuming Krushchev was in control to a very unrealistic degree. Thought of themselves of more in control as they were, like in Vietnam and Iraq. Patricia always said, major aspect, is that they guys think of themselves in control. Good exchange in *Days of Thunder*, Nicole Kidman to Tom Cruise. [End of tape].

These guys far more prudent but yet for reasons of culpable ignorance and failures of communication, playing a very dangerous game. Even if you allow for everything they couldn't have known, and take what they should have or could have known, extremely culpable. If take nuclear weapons out, scale of conflict akin to the Trojan Wars.

Kruschev concerned about Germans getting from nuclear weapons. Test ban. Misreading the Test Ban as thoroughly as invasion of Cuba.

Wednesday, December 27, 2006

Why is the Eden book strange. Answer: She doesn't really give the count of how many people would be killed. How can you say unless you calculate what it is. Main effect from fire rather than blast, including much larger area. When you include the fallout, how does it compare. Conceivable that people killed by the fire will be killed by the fallout. Startling that question was why warplanners had not figured it in, but without addressing what difference this makes towards our attitudes towards nuclear war and strategy and nuclear winter. Nuclear winter risk seems much greater.

Didn't tape this one.